[Editorial] Freeze not enough

President Lee Jae Myung has proposed easing sanctions on North Korea in exchange for a freeze on its development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile technology as a way to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

The proposal, outlined in an interview with The New York Times published on Monday, can be understood as an approach that calls for not making denuclearization a precondition but instead starting with a realistically achievable freeze on North Korea's nuclear program. It is also an extension of President Lee's vision for a peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, based on the three-stage denuclearization goals he laid out last year: a nuclear freeze, nuclear reduction and nuclear disarmament.

However, the proposal to ease sanctions on the premise of a freeze rather than denuclearization is concerning because it could effectively legitimize North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons as a fait accompli.

If the US and North Korea agreed to President Lee's proposal, Pyongyang would effectively be removing only the threat posed to the United States by the intercontinental ballistic missiles it has yet to perfect. In return, North Korea could have the sanctions that have weighed down its economy for more than three decades lifted. However, its nuclear weapons and short- and medium-range missiles would remain intact, posing a greater threat to South Korea's security with its sanctions lifted.

In the interview, Lee described sanctions against North Korea as "not being particularly effective."

Sanctions may have failed to completely prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. But North Korean leader Kim Jong-un engaged in dialogue with the US and South Korea because of the economic pressure from sanctions. Lifting sanctions while the North retains nuclear weapons is precisely what Kim wanted. If sanctions were lifted, allowing the North to easily import special metals, its nuclear and missile development could gain significant momentum if they were pursued in secret.

Lifting sanctions in return for a "freeze," rather than "dismantlement," would be tantamount to rewarding North Korea for its illicit development of nuclear weapons and missiles.

Even if Pyongyang claims to have frozen its nuclear program, it means nothing if the freeze cannot be verified. All the denuclearization negotiations with North Korea to date have collapsed because it either refused to declare its nuclear programs and allow verification or deceived inspectors.

If the agreement collapses, North Korea can easily resume its nuclear and ICBM development, but once international sanctions are lifted, it is difficult to tighten them again. If North Korea breaks its promise to freeze its nuclear programs, there will be no means of responding once the sanctions are gone.

Given that North Korea has recently slammed the door shut on dialogue, even a step-by-step approach appears to be a vain hope. Pyongyang is ignoring inter-Korean dialogue and continuing to strengthen its nuclear forces while regarding South and North Korea as "two hostile states." On Tuesday, North Korea also claimed to have successfully tested a "new weapon" believed to be a hypersonic missile, with Kim Jong-un in attendance.

The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan reaffirmed their commitment to the "complete denuclearization of North Korea" in a joint statement issued following their trilateral talks in New York on Monday.

The ultimate goal of the North Korea policy agreed upon by South Korea, the US and Japan is still the complete denuclearization of North Korea. Sanctions relief should be provided in stages, in line with North Korea’s substantive implementation of its commitments and thorough verification.

It is dangerous to lift sanctions against the North in exchange for leaving its nuclear program as is. China or Russia, both of which side with North Korea, might make such a claim, but it is not something the leader of a country directly threatened by North Korea should call for.