[Tanee Sangrat] Changes in world order, politics around Korean Peninsula

The geopolitical landscape surrounding the Korean Peninsula has been changing rapidly, with the possibility of renewed dialogue between the United States and North Korea emerging as a key focal point. This could do more than simply improve bilateral relations; it could serve as a catalyst for reshaping the Northeast Asian security architecture and the international economic order.

Soon after US President Donald Trump on Oct. 19 triggered speculation of a possible meeting with Kim Jong-un by noting their good relationship, Germany announced its Asian diplomatic itinerary, and diplomatic activities involving China, Japan and South Korea soon followed.

The central event driving these developments was the prospect of dialogue between the US and North Korea.

On Oct. 29, North Korea launched short-range ballistic missiles toward the East Sea. The launches may have been intended as both a response to efforts to strengthen security cooperation among South Korea, the US and Japan, and a broader warning to the international community.

Given Japan’s efforts to strengthen its security cooperation with the US and expand its military role in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea’s latest launches could also have been a warning directed at Japan.

China and Japan have responded to the launches in markedly different ways.

Japan condemned them as violations of UN Security Council resolutions and viewed them as a national security threat. Tokyo lodged a formal protest with Pyongyang through its embassy in Beijing and sought to strengthen security coordination with Seoul and Washington.

China acknowledged the various countries’ differing views, avoided directly criticizing North Korea, and emphasized the need for a political solution.

China’s position reflects its intention to preserve strategic leverage over North Korea while counterbalancing the strengthening South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation.

Japan is likely to use the North Korean threat to justify increasing its own defense capabilities and military cooperation with the US.

North Korea’s launches may have had multiple objectives, including demonstrating its military presence and strengthening its bargaining position ahead of talks.

If US-North Korea dialogue materializes, Washington may adjust its approach from one centered on deterrence toward a more comprehensive strategy combining nuclear threat management with political and economic negotiations.

That strategic shift could show up in three major areas:

First, while maintaining the stated objective of North Korea’s complete denuclearization, the United States could explore more pragmatic approaches. Washington is likely to pursue direct negotiations with Pyongyang to manage tensions on the Korean Peninsula and reduce its strategic burden.

North Korea might pursue economic opening and gradual integration into the international economic system.

Second, negotiations could begin to end the war in Ukraine and reset US-Russia relations. This could create new opportunities for economic cooperation around Russian energy and logistics networks.

Third, the US might seek to reduce its global security burden by demanding its allies increase defense spending and take on more security responsibilities.

This could lead to changes in the respective roles of South Korea and Japan, as well as the structure of security cooperation between the two countries.

If the US manages the North Korean nuclear threat to some extent through direct negotiations, Japan’s priorities — including complete denuclearization and the abduction issue — could lose their prominence in Washington’s negotiating priorities.

Tokyo has been strengthening trilateral security cooperation on the basis of its alliance with Washington, while seeking to expand its military role in Northeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

However, if talks lead to a shift in Washington’s North Korea policy, Japan’s strategic interests could diverge from the US’ policy direction.

Japan’s influence over negotiations with North Korea could weaken as Washington pursues direct negotiations with Pyongyang.

Any recalibration of US-Russia relations would inevitably require Japan to reconsider its own strategy toward Russia.

An expansion of China’s influence over North Korea could complicate Japan’s strategy of counterbalancing China.

A potential mismatch could emerge between the security role Japan expects to play and the responsibilities Washington seeks to assign to it as part of a broader redistribution of security burdens.

As the US moves toward dialogue with North Korea, China is likely to seek to maintain its diplomatic influence over Pyongyang and secure its own strategic position in peninsular matters.

Kim Jong-un’s visit to Dandong on Oct. 24 and his communications with Chinese officials may indicate an effort to coordinate strategic positions ahead of potential US talks.

China is likely to maintain its long-standing interests in ensuring the stability of the North Korean regime and preserving North Korea as a strategic buffer, while seeking to counterbalance any expansion of US influence in Northeast Asia.

Going forward, China may attempt to expand its role as a mediator or as a country with significant influence over negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, while the US seeks to limit such Chinese influence.

As the traditional NATO-centered security order undergoes changes, Germany is moving to strengthen strategic relations with major Asian countries in an effort to secure influence over the emerging international order.

Germany held an intensive series of diplomatic engagements through Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visits to Singapore, Japan and South Korea from Oct. 26-30, and President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s state visit to China from Oct. 27-31.

The decision to dispatch Steinmeier to China while Merz visited Japan and South Korea can be interpreted as a multilayered strategy: maintaining relations with China while simultaneously building economic and security networks with Japan and South Korea.

Germany’s diplomatic objectives can be broadly described as follows:

* China: Maintaining bilateral relations and strategic communication, recognizing China’s importance in the global economy and international order

* Japan: Expanding defense industry and economic security cooperation to maintain Europe’s influence in the Indo-Pacific

* South Korea: Strengthening strategic partnership through cooperation in key industries, while leveraging security issues on the Korean Peninsula

Merz’s visit to the Demilitarized Zone on Oct. 30 could reflect Germany’s recognition that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has increasingly linked the security of Europe with that of South Korea.

Germany’s latest diplomatic initiatives extend beyond the pursuit of new Asian markets. Against the backdrop of a changing international order, Germany appears to be building relationships with key East Asian countries to ensure that it does not become marginalized.

If changes in US policy toward North Korea, the recalibration of US-Russia relations, and the redistribution of responsibilities among US allies become a reality, the Korean Peninsula could emerge as a pivotal region where changes in the Northeast Asian security architecture intersect with the transformation of the Eurasian economic order.

South Korea possesses several distinctive geopolitical and economic advantages: its security alliance with the United States, its economic relationship with China, and its position as a direct stakeholder in the North Korea issue.

It also has strong industrial competitiveness in advanced manufacturing sectors, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, shipbuilding, defense and batteries. These factors are likely to enhance South Korea’s strategic value in the process of restructuring the international order.

In particular, if North Korea enters a period of economic opening and reconstruction, South Korea could secure significant opportunities in the following areas:

* North Korea’s reconstruction: Taking part in projects by combining financial and industrial capital from the international community with South Korea’s manufacturing, construction and infrastructure capabilities; While South Korea’s initial participation may be limited to indirect involvement, its role could gradually expand.

* Russian energy: Rebuilding energy supply networks on the Korean Peninsula using Russian natural gas and other energy resources

* Eurasian logistics: Connecting the Korean Peninsula with Europe and Central Asia through integrated railway, port and road networks

* Development of industrial hubs: Establishing Busan and Ulsan as major Northeast Asian hubs for logistics, energy, refining and petrochemicals

* Cooperation with Europe: Pursuing joint projects that combine advanced technologies from Germany and other major European countries with South Korea’s capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing, AI and defense

South Korea needs to position itself not merely as a security partner or an economic beneficiary in the emerging international order, but as a key country capable of taking a leading role in North Korea’s reconstruction and the integration of the Eurasian economic region.

Fundamentally, US-North Korea dialogue should not be viewed merely as an issue of bilateral relations. It could reshape the US’ global strategy and the foreign policies of China, Russia, Japan and Europe.

South Korea should seek to turn this geopolitical shift into an opportunity to strengthen its strategic standing on the Korean Peninsula and achieve a new phase of economic growth.

Tanee Sangrat is Thailand’s deputy permanent secretary for foreign affairs, and served as ambassador to South Korea from April 2024 to September 2026. The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own. — Ed.