[Contribution] From Zeitenwende to strategic industrial partnership: A new chapter in Germany-Korea defense cooperation

For decades, Germany and South Korea have built a strong relationship through trade, investment, technological exchange and the shared historical experience of national division. Today, that relationship has acquired a more consequential strategic dimension. As Europe confronts its most serious security crisis since the end of the Cold War, South Korea has emerged as an important partner in rebuilding European defense industrial capacity. For Germany and Korea, this presents an opportunity to turn a long-standing economic relationship into a more consequential strategic partnership.

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 upended the strategic assumptions that had shaped German security policy for decades. Berlin could no longer count on economic interdependence to temper Russian aggression or take peace in Europe for granted. At the same time, uncertainty about the future scale and reliability of American security commitments has intensified the debate over Europe's ability to defend itself. This has fundamentally altered the political priorities of European nations: Defense, deterrence and industrial resilience are now at the center of Europe's strategic planning.

Germany's response was the Zeitenwende — a historic turning point in its foreign and security policy. It involved a commitment to strengthen the Bundeswehr (the German military), accelerate military procurement and take greater responsibility for European security. The scale of this shift is reflected in rising defense expenditures. Germany's total defense expenditure reached approximately 86.5 billion euros ($96.2 billion) in 2025, while the 2026 budget amounts to around 108.2 billion euros, including resources from the Bundeswehr special fund — more than twice the 2022 level of the regular defense budget.

Yet money alone cannot deliver military readiness. After years of underinvestment, Germany faces procurement delays, industrial bottlenecks and insufficient production capacity. Germany, and Europe more broadly, urgently needs to replenish its stocks of ammunition, artillery, armored vehicles and air defense systems, while expanding production capacity to meet the demands of a more dangerous security environment and ensuring that European industry can manufacture, maintain and replenish the equipment required for sustained deterrence. This is where South Korea can play an important role.

South Korea's defense industry has demonstrated its ability to combine advanced technology, competitive pricing and rapid production and delivery. Its major defense agreements with numerous European countries show the capacity of Korean manufacturers to respond to urgent European requirements at scale. At a time when European governments are seeking to replenish military stocks and expand production, these strengths are strategically significant.

As such, the opportunity for increased defense industrial cooperation between Germany and Korea is significant. However, the German market requires a tailored approach. Germany's defense sector has its own industrial traditions, established supplier networks, procurement structures and strategic priorities. Entering this market therefore involves more than offering competitive products or responding to urgent equipment requirements.

Korean companies need to understand the specific needs of the Bundeswehr, build trust with German industrial partners and procurement authorities, and demonstrate a long-term commitment to the German defense industrial base. Local partnerships, investment in production and maintenance capabilities, and cooperation with established German suppliers are essential to developing a sustainable market presence.

The challenge — and the opportunity — is to move beyond individual export contracts toward a strategy that aligns Korean industrial strengths with Germany's security requirements and industrial priorities, creating lasting value for both sides.

A strong foundation is already in place to develop German-Korean defense industrial relations further into a strategic defense industrial partnership. Germany has historically played an important role in the development of South Korea's defense industry through technology transfers and industrial cooperation. German expertise in naval systems, propulsion, transmissions and specialized components has contributed to Korean military capabilities.

Submarine cooperation is a particularly instructive example: Technology transfers and licensed production helped South Korea establish capabilities that it subsequently developed through increasingly indigenous design and manufacturing. This experience offers an important lesson and illustrates the long-term value of industrial cooperation and technology transfers.

Having benefited from German expertise during its industrial development, South Korea is now positioned to contribute advanced defense technologies and manufacturing capabilities to Germany's Zeitenwende.

Given the distinctive requirements of the German (and wider European) defense industrial base, the most promising areas of cooperation include integrated air and missile defense, especially layered defense capabilities, interceptors, radar and systems complementary to existing platforms such as Patriot, whose availability has become very limited.

Moreover, both a need and potential for cooperation exist in the areas of guided weapons and precision fires (such as advanced missiles, long-range fires and affordable precision weapons), counter-UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) and uncrewed and autonomous systems, as well as artillery, rocket launchers and ammunition.

Korean investment in production facilities in Germany could help alleviate capacity constraints and embed Korean manufacturers more firmly in Europe's defense industrial ecosystem. German firms, in turn, could contribute specialized technologies, components, engineering expertise and access to established industrial networks.

Joint ventures, localized production and carefully designed technology-sharing arrangements could shorten supply chains and support the readiness of the Bundeswehr and other European armed forces — while German companies could expand their international partnerships and access additional manufacturing capacity.

Where interests align, the two sides could also pursue opportunities in third-country markets. Competition between German and Korean companies for international contracts will remain a reality. However, competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive; both can be integral elements of a strategic partnership, which should focus on identifying areas where closer cooperation can deliver greater value and stronger results than either side could achieve alone.

Defense industrial cooperation cannot be treated as an ordinary commercial undertaking. Decisions about investment, technology sharing, production capacity and procurement have direct implications for national security and often extend over many years, if not decades. Companies are unlikely to commit substantial resources if procurement priorities remain unpredictable, regulations are uncertain or political support can be withdrawn with each change of government.

As defense industrial cooperation cannot be separated from the broader security relationship between Germany and South Korea, the two countries should embed defense industrial cooperation within a broader bilateral strategic partnership. This requires sustained political commitment on both sides. Governments cannot eliminate commercial risk. They can, however, provide a stable policy framework within which companies can make informed, long-term decisions.

A practical step would be to establish a regular, high-level German-Korean defense industrial task force. Despite a long-standing history of technological and industrial cooperation, bilateral defense industry relations have largely developed through individual procurement programs, technology transfers and company-level partnerships.

As defense industrial relations enter a new era, a dedicated Korea-Germany defense industrial task force could provide a more structured platform connecting government authorities, defense manufacturers, research institutions and technology companies.

The task force could identify priorities for joint R&D, industrial investment, local manufacturing and supply chain cooperation, while addressing regulatory challenges involving procurement, export controls, certification, industrial security and interoperability. It could also facilitate partnerships between established defense manufacturers and innovative SMEs and start-ups, helping translate emerging technologies into practical industrial programs.

Such a framework would strengthen bilateral coordination while supporting Germany's defense industrial base and wider European requirements.

Germany and South Korea have already demonstrated what technology transfers and industrial cooperation can achieve. The next step is to build on that experience through a partnership founded on reciprocity, shared responsibility and long-term strategic purpose.

That is how the Zeitenwende can become more than a turning point in German security policy. It can also become the starting point for a new chapter in German-Korean relations — one that strengthens European deterrence and turns a long-standing economic relationship into a lasting strategic partnership.

Dr. Eric J. Ballbach serves as the Korea Foundation Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP), in its Asia Research Division. His research focuses on the foreign and security policies of North and South Korea, particularly EU/NATO-Korea relations, Europe-Korea defense industrial cooperation, the sanctions regime against North Korea and North Korea's military modernization. The views in this column are his own. — Ed.