A new tendency is emerging in Washington that portrays North Korea as a strategic winner. The war in Ukraine, intensifying US-China rivalry and expanding military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow have all contributed to the perception that North Korea has gained strategic momentum. A growing number of analysts argue that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has taken advantage of the geopolitical upheavals and successfully repositioned his country. Ironically, some analysts who once emphasized North Korea’s fragility now describe Kim as a highly successful geopolitical player.
It is true that North Korea has undeniably improved its strategic status compared with the difficult years following the collapse of the Hanoi summit in 2019. Yet the growing tendency to describe Kim as a geopolitical victor also risks creating another analytical distortion. For decades, many observers repeatedly predicted the imminent collapse of the North Korean regime. Everybody knows at last that that is not the case. Now a different danger is emerging: the tendency to overcorrect by overstating North Korea’s strategic strength. Neither interpretation fully captures reality.
North Korea was not on the verge of collapse, nor is it an unconstrained strategic power. It remains a heavily constrained state operating under persistent political, economic and structural pressures. Kim has demonstrated adaptability, but adaptability should not be confused with strategic success.
North Korea’s diplomatic position has shifted, but it has not fundamentally expanded. Relations with the US and South Korea remain frozen. The collapse of negotiations after 2019 left Pyongyang without a realistic pathway toward sanctions relief, broader economic integration or stable engagement with advanced economies. Cooperation with Russia and China may provide temporary strategic space, but such relationships remain asymmetric and heavily dependent on the interests of larger powers.
Some analysts argue that this new alignment represents a durable geopolitical breakthrough for North Korea. However, what appears to be expanded diplomatic space may actually be a narrower form of dependence. Pyongyang has reduced isolation in form while deepening reliance on external powers in substance.
A similar pattern can be seen in the military sphere. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal undoubtedly strengthens deterrence. However, these advances have not fundamentally changed the overall balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, backed by the US alliance system and extended deterrence, continues to possess overwhelming superiority in conventional military capabilities, advanced technology and economic resources.
We have to admit that North Korea has increased nuclear capabilities and strengthened its deterrence against the US and the South. However, deterrence itself is not a permanent condition. It depends on credibility, perception and crisis management. Heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for structural weakness also introduces new dangers, including escalation risks and strategic instability. That might be the reason why Kim is trying to strengthen his conventional weapons.
The deeper limitations of the success narrative emerge most clearly in the domestic political sphere. North Korea’s political system has traditionally relied on inherited revolutionary legitimacy. Two major narratives have historically sustained this structure: resistance against external imperial enemies and the mission of national reunification. These themes provided ideological coherence while reinforcing the authority of the ruling leadership.
Kim Jong-un has largely preserved the narrative of resistance through continued emphasis on military strength and confrontation with external adversaries. In that sense, his approach remains consistent with the traditional foundations of regime legitimacy. However, an important transformation is underway. Abandoning the reunification narrative weakens one of the regime’s traditional ideological pillars. For decades, the goal of national unity helped justify the regime’s unitary guidance system by linking it to a broader historical mission. As that objective fades, the ideological foundation of autocratic rule becomes narrower and more dependent on other sources of legitimacy.
To compensate, Kim increasingly appears to rely on new success narratives. His leadership is associated with visible military achievements, strategic decisiveness and displays of national strength with the promise of economic growth. This reflects a growing emphasis on charismatic leadership alongside traditional legitimacy.
Such a hybrid system may function effectively in the short term, but it also creates new burdens. Traditional legitimacy depends on continuity and inherited historical narratives. Charismatic legitimacy requires continuous demonstration of achievement and competence. Maintaining both simultaneously raises political pressure on the leadership.
More importantly, economic policy further complicates this dilemma. In recent years, Kim has repeatedly emphasized economic development and improvements in living standards. This suggests an effort to build performance-based legitimacy. In other words, the regime increasingly seeks validation not only through nuclear capability but also through tangible economic results. This shift creates a structural contradiction. Meaningful economic development in North Korea is extremely difficult without broader external engagement. Long-term growth would likely require improved relations with South Korea, the US and Japan, along with partial integration into the global economy. Such engagement would almost certainly require concessions related to the nuclear program. Here lies Kim’s central dilemma.
The nuclear program strengthens the regime’s narrative of resistance and reinforces traditional legitimacy. At the same time, it obstructs the external engagement necessary for economic modernization and performance-based legitimacy. Efforts to preserve one source of legitimacy therefore weaken the conditions needed to strengthen another. This is not simply a policy contradiction. It is a structural contradiction embedded within the regime itself.
For this reason, assessments portraying North Korea as a clear strategic winner should be approached with caution. Some visible diplomatic and military gains do not erase the structural constraints, political contradictions and legitimacy pressures that continue to shape the regime.
A balanced understanding of North Korea requires analytical discipline. Underestimating the regime can produce dangerous complacency. Overestimating it can be equally misleading. Kim Jong-un is not simply winning or losing. He is managing a system that has acquired new capabilities while simultaneously accumulating new risks. North Korea may appear stronger on the surface, but beneath that appearance, the regime faces mounting contradictions that will become increasingly difficult to manage.
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Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
