[Man-Ki Kim] Security beyond self-reliant defense

Global instability is intensifying. The prolonged war in Ukraine, North Korea’s growing military ties with Russia, unrest in the Middle East, and supply-chain threats in the Strait of Hormuz all point to one reality: economic security can no longer be assumed. For Korea, lasting security depends not only on economic growth, defense industrial progress, or technological advancement, but also on recognizing a vital distinction: autonomy is not the same as security.

A Self-reliant National Defense is the capability to act independently. Security is defined by a nation's actual capabilities, alliances and the deterrence that protects it. Confusing these terms would be dangerous for Korea. Greater autonomy should bolster national defense, not create the illusion that Korea can replace the alliance structure that has secured its safety for decades.

For decades, the United States has helped shape global stability and the Indo-Pacific security architecture. South Korea’s economic success was achieved through Korean sacrifice and effort, as well as through a security framework anchored in the Korea-US alliance. That framework is now shifting as Washington redefines its global role and deterrence priorities. Reports of possible US force reductions among key European allies add urgency, reminding Seoul and Washington that US Forces Korea is a strategic asset supporting deterrence against North Korea and stability in a region shaped by China’s rise and Russia’s alliance with North Korea. The presence of USFK remains a cornerstone of the Korea-US alliance, which has endured since the Korean War and continues to anchor peace on the peninsula.

Recent testimony by USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson before the US Congress underscored the shifting and urgent strategic environment. Seoul and Washington must meet the conditions for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) by fiscal year 2029, but this process should not be politically convenient. This is a critical task: Korea must urgently prepare for new responsibilities — premature confidence could be disastrous.

The crucial question remains: does Korea’s drive for Self-reliant National Defense actually increase security, or merely redistribute burdens without improving deterrence? Self-reliant defense is meaningful only if it provides measurable security solutions. Korea’s satellite reconnaissance capabilities enhance monitoring of North Korea, but they cannot match the depth, persistence and integration of US intelligence capabilities. Intelligence-sharing with the United States remains essential for defense readiness and crisis management.

Complacency, emotional nationalism and strategic ambiguity now pose real dangers. Korea must decisively strengthen economic, diplomatic and defense ties with the United States. Any weakening of trust risks consequences that go far beyond any single administration or political cycle.

Recent developments show that alliance management is increasingly complex. Differences over access to the Demilitarized Zone, USFK air exercises, intelligence sharing, and the timing and conditions of the OPCON transfer require strategic and proactive management. Goodwill alone is insufficient.

The effects of alliance dynamics also extend beyond security. Recent business disputes, such as the Coupang controversy, show how easily corporate issues can spill into the political space. Korea has every right to enforce its laws, protect consumers and investigate corporate misconduct. No company is above domestic law. Firms earning more than 90 percent of their revenue in Korea must demonstrate respect, accountability and humility toward the Korean public.

Korea and the US must keep the alliance strategy separate from corporate disputes. Washington and Seoul should establish clear boundaries and allow markets to operate freely. Strategic priorities must not be challenged by the business activities of a specific company.

Korea’s security landscape is one of the world’s most challenging. North Korea is expanding its nuclear and missile capabilities. China is growing more assertive in the region. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows that large-scale conflict is not obsolete. North Korea’s military engagement with Russia may also provide Pyongyang with lessons in modern warfare, further complicating deterrence. Only a credible Korea-US alliance can provide comprehensive deterrence against these threats.

Korea must face reality: its security is nontransferable. Underestimating the US alliance would be a grave error. Korea’s path is neither dependency nor isolation. It is a robust national capability anchored in a resilient alliance.

Korea’s defense industry provides advanced capabilities in missiles, shipbuilding and aerospace. However, only US nuclear deterrence offers unparalleled protection against North Korea’s arsenal. Even as Korea strives for new strategic capabilities, these tools will not materialize quickly. The urgent question Korea must answer now is: What is credible deterrence today? Diplomatic overtures and rhetorical assertions of autonomy are no substitutes for genuine preparedness and unwavering resolve in alliance.

Regular and structured Korea-US military exercises remain central to deterrence. Scaling them back or politicizing them risks signaling weakness to North Korea and the wider region. Deterrence relies on unity, readiness and resolve. It falters when adversaries see hesitation or division.

Korea’s economy depends on stable security. US Forces in Korea support deterrence and signal global stability for investors. Korea must act decisively: ensure that every effort to enhance autonomy directly reinforces the US alliance. Policymakers should implement concrete measures to align autonomy with alliance commitments, strengthening shared security. Only by taking specific, deliberate steps can Korea avoid confusing autonomy with genuine security and ensure its future stability.

That is the self-reliant national defense that the Korean people needed.

Man-Ki Kim

Man-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yulchon. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed.