[Man-Ki Kim] Poland at center of Korea's defense industry in Europe

Geopolitical pressures beyond its immediate borders are reshaping Europe’s security environment.

Tensions in the Middle East are not central to Europe, but they reinforce a broader strategic shift. The United States is recalibrating alliances, now emphasizing transactional considerations over traditional diplomatic alignment. Europe is reducing its reliance on American security guarantees and strengthening its own defense. This is not a temporary adjustment. It reflects a deeper transformation in Europe’s security posture.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, that transformation has accelerated. What began as a geopolitical shock has become a structural reset for European defense. Governments are no longer focused on gradual modernization. Instead, they are expanding capabilities, strengthening industrial resilience, and prioritizing operational readiness.

For South Korea, this moment creates more than a commercial opportunity. It marks a strategic inflection point — Poland stands at its center.

Korea’s defense industry, forged under constant pressure, is built for urgency and reliability. It delivers what Europe now needs: Speed, cost-efficiency and proven capability.

This foundation has led to tangible export success. In 2025, Korea’s defense exports reached $15.4 billion. Europe accounted for the largest share. Poland is at the forefront of this expansion.

Since 2022, Poland has signed major defense agreements with Korean manufacturers. Deals have included K2 tanks, K9 howitzers, K239 rocket systems, and FA-50 aircraft. The total value exceeds $14 billion, making them among the largest defense procurements in Europe in recent decades. During this period, Korea supplied nearly half of Poland’s total arms imports.

Poland moves from being a customer to serving as Korea’s strategic anchor in Europe.

This strategic shift is reinforced by the recent visit of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to Seoul. Both countries agreed to elevate their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The timing shows a growing convergence between industrial cooperation and geopolitical alignment.

As a frontline NATO state, Poland is quickly modernizing and positioning itself as a regional defense hub. This makes it a gateway for Korean systems to broaden Europe.

The pattern is clear. Countries such as Norway, Finland, Estonia and Romania have adopted Korean platforms, particularly the K9 howitzer. Their decisions reflect more than competitive pricing. They show confidence in Korea’s ability to meet NATO standards, ensure interoperability, and deliver on time.

As Korea’s presence expands, so do the challenges.

Europe is not rebuilding its defense to stay dependent on external suppliers. Across the continent, governments aim for strategic autonomy by strengthening their own industrial bases. They are expanding joint procurement and building intra-European supply chains. Poland is leading this shift through localized production and industrial cooperation.

The European Union’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program shows this direction. With 150 billion euros ($176 billion) in low-interest financing, SAFE promotes joint production and reinforces Europe’s defense industrial base. Poland is expected to be one of its biggest beneficiaries.

If Korea remains only an external supplier, Europe will internalize more of its defense production, and Korea’s role will gradually diminish.

For Korea, this signals a clear strategic direction. Korea must approach Europe — and especially Poland — not as a market, but as a long-term partner for defense industrial integration.

Korea must move beyond an export-driven approach and embed itself within Europe’s defense ecosystem, with Poland as the anchor. This means prioritizing local production, joint research and development, and technology transfer. Korea should also establish manufacturing capacity and a regional maintenance, repair, and overhaul hub in Poland. At the same time, Korea must strengthen government-to-government ties with European defense frameworks. It should participate in initiatives such as SAFE to integrate into Europe’s growing industrial base.

Human capital cooperation matters as much. Korea should expand training for Polish engineers and military personnel. Deepening academic partnerships through institutions such as KAIST will also help. These steps will build strong operational and institutional ties. In parallel, Korea must improve its defense procurement financing package for Poland. It should offer long-term loans, credit guarantees, and scalable financial packages. These can be supported by institutions like the Export-Import Bank of Korea.

Thus, the challenge facing Korea today is no longer entering the European market. Instead, it is about securing a lasting role within it.

Speed, reliability and proven capability have made Korea a leading defense exporter. But these strengths alone will not be enough in a Europe determined to rebuild its own industrial base. Without deeper integration, today’s advantages could fade as Europe’s capacity grows.

Poland gives Korea more than a market. It provides a strategic platform for long-term partnership, industrial integration and regional expansion.

The window of opportunity is closing fast. If Korea hesitates, it will not just lose a market; it will lose more. It will lose its place in Europe’s future defense architecture. As Europe rebuilds its defense capabilities, Korea must move beyond exports and embed itself within the continent’s industrial base

Current choices will decide if Korea is a temporary supplier or a lasting partner in Europe’s security.

Man-Ki Kim

Man-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yulchon. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed.