The summit between US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen, China has prompted comparisons with the Yalta Conference of 1945. Some call it Yalta 2.0, invoking Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. However, the comparison could be misleading. More importantly, it may serve Putin's political interests.
The idea of a new Yalta appears to have emerged from Russian political circles. Putin has an obvious interest in presenting himself as one of three superpower leaders capable of determining the future of the international order. Such an image would elevate Russia's international standing regardless of what the summit actually achieves.
Ironically, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has been among the most prominent figures warning against another Yalta. His concern is understandable. Ukraine has every reason to oppose any arrangement in which powerful countries determine its future without its participation.
Yet there is a paradox. The more Zelenskyy and others warn against a new Yalta, the more they may reinforce the very image Putin would like to promote. By treating the Shenzhen summit as a potential gathering of three rulers of the world, they risk granting Putin a status that Russia's actual capabilities do not justify.
The deeper problem is a fundamentally flawed historical analogy. The Yalta Conference took place in February 1945, when World War II was approaching its conclusion in Europe. The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union were the principal Allied powers fighting Nazi Germany. Their leaders needed to coordinate the final stages of the war and discuss the political arrangements that would follow Germany's defeat.
The circumstances made such a conference practically necessary. After devastating warfare, Europe had to deal with collapsed governments and mass displacement. Without coordination among the major Allied powers, the transition from war to peace could have produced even greater disorder. The conference was not simply a meeting of powerful countries claiming the right to govern the world. It was also a meeting of wartime allies confronting an extraordinary responsibility created by a global conflict.
That does not mean its decisions were necessarily fair. Poland and other European countries were deeply affected by arrangements negotiated without their full participation. France and China, although members of the Allied coalition, were not represented at Yalta. The conference demonstrated both the practical necessity and the moral dangers of great-power diplomacy. Nevertheless, the fundamental circumstances of 2026 are entirely different.
Russia now is not a victorious power emerging from a world war, and Ukraine is not a defeated country awaiting decisions about its future. The United States, China and Russia are not wartime allies preparing to administer a defeated enemy. They do not share a common mission comparable to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Their interests diverge: Trump seeks nuclear arms control, Putin recognition and concessions over Ukraine, while Xi has little reason to embrace their objectives. The three leaders may reach agreements on specific issues. But that is fundamentally different from possessing either the authority or the ability to establish a new international order.
Another important difference concerns the distribution of power. In 1945, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union occupied extraordinary positions in the international system. Military and territorial control gave them enormous influence over the postwar settlement.
Today, the United States and China possess comprehensive economic, technological and military capabilities. Russia, however, is in a more complicated position.
Russia remains a formidable nuclear power. Its strategic arsenal makes it an indispensable participant in serious nuclear arms control negotiations. Its permanent membership on the UN Security Council also gives it substantial diplomatic influence.
But military power alone does not establish comprehensive global leadership. Russia's economy is far smaller than those of the United States and China. Its technological and industrial capabilities are also more limited. Its economic standing does not match the image of a country capable of shaping the entire international order on equal terms with Washington and Beijing.
A third fundamental difference lies in the transformation of international norms. In 1945, colonial empires still dominated large parts of the world. Rules against aggressive war existed, but enforcement institutions remained weak.
Today, the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states. Sovereign equality and national self-determination have become central principles of international relations. Decolonization has transformed the political landscape. These rules are frequently violated. Russia's invasion of Ukraine itself demonstrates the continuing gap between international law and political reality. But the existence of violations does not mean the rules have disappeared.
There is an enormous difference between a world in which imperial domination was widely practiced and one in which territorial conquest faces established legal prohibitions and international opposition. Even if three powerful leaders agree on the future of another country, their agreement cannot automatically create legitimacy, compel acceptance or guarantee implementation.
None of this means the Shenzhen summit should be dismissed as harmless. Ukraine has legitimate reasons for concern. So do other countries and communities whose interests could be affected by great-power bargaining, including Iran, Taiwan and Japan. The international community should closely examine the summit's agenda, agreements and consequences.
But vigilance is different from exaggeration. Concern is different from panic. Historical awareness is different from historical confusion. The proper response is to assess their actual agreements and implications for other countries. Imagining a return to 1945 before the emergence of any such outcome risks producing misguided reactions.
The greatest danger is not that another Yalta Conference will suddenly emerge in Shenzhen. It is that governments and observers may become so absorbed in the memory of Yalta that they misunderstand the international system in which they actually live.
History should guide our judgment, not imprison our imagination. Shenzhen in 2026 is not Yalta in 1945. Treating them as equivalent may be one of the easiest ways to give Putin a diplomatic victory he has not earned.
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Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com


