Washington has absorbed two extraordinary shocks within days. A Democratic “blue tsunami” has reshaped Congress, effectively turning the remainder of Donald Trump's presidency into a lame-duck administration. Meanwhile, reports of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang's abrupt resignation amid allegations involving a suspected Chinese intelligence operative have unsettled the technology industry. Together, these developments reveal a difficult reality for Korea: upheaval in Washington can have serious consequences for our security, investments and technological future.
History offers a lesson. When Washington pressed the Netherlands to restrict exports of advanced chipmaking equipment to China, Dutch company ASML was caught between American security demands and commercial interests. Dutch leaders had to balance these pressures while protecting national interests. Korea faces a similar test, but with considerably more at stake.
Our economic security is closely intertwined with America's. Korean memory chips are indispensable to America's AI industry, and our shipbuilders are being asked to bolster US industrial capacity. China remains a major market, and our security still relies heavily on the US-Korea alliance and American extended deterrence. These connections cannot be severed simply because Washington and Beijing disagree. Seoul must navigate these strategic and economic realities without compromising its sovereign judgment.
In "Why Nations Fail," Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that long-term prosperity largely depends on the quality of political and economic institutions. Their argument raises an uncomfortable question for Korea: Do we have the political discipline, judgment, adaptability and capacity for collective action to protect our interests as the international environment shifts?
Four challenges now confront Seoul.
First, national security. Washington expects Korea to assume greater defense responsibility, as emphasized in its National Security Strategy. President Lee Jae Myung seeks to advance the transition to wartime operational control during his term. But are Korean forces sufficiently prepared in command, intelligence and operational readiness to counter North Korea's growing capabilities? Political timetables cannot answer that question. Only rigorous joint assessments and readiness exercises can.
Greater Korean responsibility should not diminish American cooperation. Intelligence sharing, joint exercises and interoperability remain essential. A stronger Korean military serves both our security and American interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Second, economic security. Korea's $350 billion investment framework, including $150 billion for shipbuilding, commits extraordinary national capital. Who bears the losses if projects fail? Negotiators will eventually leave office, but the financial consequences could burden future generations.
Consider the proposed Texas power investments. Electricity purchase agreements, construction costs and projected returns matter more than political enthusiasm. The same applies to nuclear projects and Alaska LNG. Korean capital can create American jobs and industrial capacity, but investments must be grounded in commercial merit and sound feasibility studies.
Third, technological security. The Nvidia controversy raises concerns that extend beyond one company's leadership. Allegations about Jensen Huang, including reports of unauthorized chip transfers to China and export-control issues, remain unproven. Nevertheless, the episode raises questions about technological security and future semiconductor restrictions on China.
Korean semiconductor manufacturers are deeply embedded in America's AI supply chain. They could face tighter export restrictions regardless of their conduct. The ASML case reminds Seoul to engage with Washington before decisions become irreversible and to reduce excessive dependence on individual markets and technology customers.
Fourth, defense industrial cooperation. The US Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service report that the US Navy has only 293 ships, falling short of its long-term goal of 381, while China's expanding fleet challenges American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. Korea, the world's second-largest shipbuilding nation, offers capacity and expertise that few allies can match. Yet the Jones Act and Title 10 restrictions complicate cooperation. The costs of delay are not merely commercial. Delaying Korean participation in revitalizing America's naval industrial base risks widening the capability gap with China.
The success of the "Make American Shipping Great Again" initiative requires more than presidential executive orders. Statutory restrictions, congressional appropriations and procurement regulations must be addressed through the fiscal 2027 defense authorization and appropriations process. Cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, including technology transfer and nuclear fuel, should also be assessed for its strategic value to the US-Korea alliance, not solely on the basis of technology restrictions.
These challenges require foresight, institutional competence and sustained leadership. Yet perhaps Korea's greatest vulnerability lies not in Washington or Beijing but at home.
Korean politicians squander enormous energy on partisan confrontations, judicial reform disputes and repeated special investigations. Some raise legitimate questions about democratic accountability. Yet political infighting and party leadership struggles leave little room for serious debate about economic security risks or for bipartisan solutions.
Many Koreans are tired of it. We elect representatives to serve the public interest and safeguard our children's future, not pursue partisan victories. Korea's rise was built on education, entrepreneurship, institutions and the collective intelligence of its people. That collective intelligence remains. What appears absent is the political will to bring it together across party lines.
We cannot control Washington's divisions or the rivalry between America and China, but we can determine how our institutions respond. The central lesson of "Why Nations Fail" is that prosperity cannot be taken for granted. Strong industries alone cannot secure a nation's future without responsible institutions and sound political judgment.
Korea's greatest danger may not be uncertainty abroad but political leadership at home that mistakes winning partisan battles for safeguarding the national interest.
- - -
Man-Ki Kim
Man-Ki Kim is an adjunct professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation, and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yoon & Yang. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed
khnews@heraldcorp.com
