[Editorial] Demographic gravity

The world has crossed a demographic threshold that no amount of fiscal tinkering can reverse. Adults aged 65 and older now outnumber children under 5 worldwide for the first time, according to the US Census Bureau.

While this structural pivot affects every major economy, South Korea is accelerating through it faster than any other nation.

The country entered the super-aged category in late 2024, when seniors reached 20 percent of the population. Their share rose to 20.3 percent in 2025 and is projected to reach 41 percent by 2060, the highest in the world.

Over the same period, the median age would climb from 46 to 59.2, while the population itself would fall from 52.19 million to 46.95 million. Japan, currently older, is projected to reach 38.8 percent, leaving Korea with a demographic profile unlike any major economy.

The more revealing number is the old-age dependency ratio. It stood at 29.5 elderly people for every 100 working-age adults last year. By 2060, it is expected to hit 81.6, leaving roughly 1.2 working-age people for each senior.

That forecast should change the policy conversation. Population aging cannot be handled as another short-term demographic emergency. The nation has to redesign institutions for a society with fewer workers, longer lives and far greater demand for pensions and care.

Start with childbirth. Seoul has spent heavily on parental allowances, housing support and other incentives, yet the basic economics of raising a child remain difficult. Expensive housing, fierce competition for educational credentials and costly private tutoring all weigh on family formation.

Family policy also needs to catch up with social reality. Support should reach households raising children outside traditional marriage, including cohabiting couples.

The second adjustment concerns productivity. A shrinking workforce does not automatically dictate a shrinking economy. Scarcer labor can make investment in machinery, robotics and artificial intelligence more attractive, allowing output to rise even as the number of workers falls.

Korea, already strong in advanced manufacturing, has an unusual opportunity to make technology part of its demographic response. The country should measure success by output per worker rather than the size of the workforce.

Its labor market needs updating alongside its factories. Seniority-based pay encourages earlier retirement by making experienced workers progressively more expensive. Greater use of task-based and performance-based pay could keep older workers economically active while giving younger employees more flexible entry points.

Another challenge is Korea’s elderly poverty rate, which stood at 40.5 percent in 2020, the highest among OECD members, although the OECD has more recently estimated it at 39.7 percent. The late introduction of the national pension, limited coverage and low benefits help explain the gap.

Meanwhile, longer lives will increase demand for health and long-term care. The Health and Welfare Ministry estimates that 10.34 percent of Koreans aged 65 and over could have dementia by 2040.

Care systems that rely heavily on unpaid family labor will become harder to sustain as families themselves become smaller. This is a fiscal issue as much as a medical one.

Some senior benefits may eventually need an age threshold above 65, which has remained unchanged since 1981. But fiscal adjustment should be paired with stronger protection for poor elderly people. A higher eligibility age cannot become a convenient way to move costs onto those least able to bear them.

Managing hyper-aging requires a dual commitment: easing the structural economic pressures that deter young adults from starting families while re-engineering labor, fiscal and care frameworks for an older population.

Demographic change offers no room for political bargaining. Korea’s economic viability hinges on how decisively its leadership transforms institutions to match this permanent reality.