The war with Iran that started with airstrikes from the United States and Israel is now in its third week. As expected, Iran has suffered heavy destruction under the overwhelming military power of the US and Israel.
Iran’s stubborn resistance to the world’s hegemonic power also follows a pattern that many observers anticipated. Yet several aspects of the conflict have unfolded in unexpected ways. Most strikingly, Iran’s preparations to counter the US assault appear weaker than many had assumed. Few expected that Iran would be struck so relentlessly with so little immediate capacity for retaliation. Nevertheless, Iran has managed to endure the blows, and its resilience seems to stem from a deep asymmetry between the two sides.
This asymmetry is first evident in the realm of weapons.
Iran has been launching Shahed-136 suicide drones against US and Israeli targets, while the defending side relies on expensive interceptor missiles. The cost difference is staggering. A Shahed drone costs roughly $20,000. A Patriot interceptor missile costs around $4 million, and at least two interceptors are typically required to destroy a single drone. In other words, it may cost $8 million to eliminate a weapon worth $20,000. If Iran can sustain such attacks for several weeks, the air defense systems of the US and Israel could face serious strain. Once those defenses weaken, the battlefield balance could shift in unexpected ways.
The asymmetry extends beyond weapons. It is also visible in the willingness to absorb casualties. Since the beginning of the war, about 15 US soldiers have been killed, while more than 1,400 Iranian soldiers and civilians have died. Yet public discontent regarding casualties has emerged more visibly in the United States than in Iran.
This reflects a fundamental characteristic of democratic societies, where media coverage continues to examine facts and truths even during wartime. In Iran, by contrast, public dissatisfaction with the government rarely appears in the open, reflecting the constraints of an authoritarian political system in which media institutions must follow the guidance of ruling authorities. Whatever the broader debate about democracy and authoritarianism, the practical result is clear: The United States has a relatively low tolerance for casualties, while Iran possesses a much higher capacity to endure them.
The asymmetry in weapons and casualty tolerance ultimately translates into an asymmetry in political costs. US President Donald Trump insists that the United States is prevailing in the war. Yet as human and material losses accumulate, domestic political resistance is likely to grow. Iran, however, may possess stronger political conditions for sustaining a prolonged conflict. Continued fighting could intensify Iranian hostility toward the US and Israel while diluting domestic criticism of the Iranian government.
Before the war began, the level of Iranian grievances against the ruling elites was critically high, and the Iranian government was cornered in a vulnerable posture. Now, the continuation of the war may even strengthen the political standing of Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei.
The asymmetry suggests that Trump may have made a major miscalculation when he initiated the attack on Iran. Washington may have assumed that its superior military power could defeat Iran and force its surrender within four to six weeks. Yet events already indicate this assumption may be mistaken.
Recent developments reinforce that impression. Reports indicate that about 2,500 US Marine expeditionary forces stationed in Okinawa, Japan are being redeployed to the Middle East. News has also emerged that some THAAD antimissile equipment deployed in South Korea has been transferred to the region. Trump has publicly asked several countries, including China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan and South Korea, to assist in escorting oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. These developments suggest that the United States did not fully anticipate Iran’s asymmetric resistance and is now struggling to adjust.
Why did Trump make such a serious miscalculation?
The answer may lie in a profound misunderstanding of Iran’s historical character and the fundamental principles of international relations. Iran is a nation with more than 2,500 years of history and a powerful sense of national pride.
The United States may be able to subdue Iran militarily, but it cannot extinguish the patriotism of the Iranian people. Nor is this phenomenon unique to Iran.
The history of international relations repeatedly shows that nations fiercely resist when their sovereignty is threatened. That is precisely why respect for sovereignty and the prohibition of the use of force have become core principles of the international system.
In the end, Trump’s miscalculation and misunderstanding may be leading toward a potentially catastrophic misfortune. When basic principles of international relations are ignored and neglected, the invasion of another country inevitably brings painful consequences.
History offers many examples.
In 1953, the US orchestrated a covert coup in Iran that removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The episode became one of the earliest sources of deep anti-American sentiment across the Middle East.
In 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was manipulated to justify deeper US involvement in the Vietnam War, drawing the country into one of the biggest quagmires in its history. The 2003 invasion of Iraq provides another striking example. Ironically, Trump himself rose to political prominence partly by criticizing the Iraq War and appealing to Americans who shared that view. Yet today he appears to be repeating an even more dangerous mistake.
As George Bernard Shaw quoted Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as saying, we learn from history that we learn nothing from history.
The tragedy of international politics is not simply that history repeats itself. It is that leaders continue to repeat the same mistakes despite knowing the lessons of the past.
World-class leaders should treat past failures not as mere records but as "lessons written in blood," abandoning arrogant military omnipotence in favor of a decisive return to the fundamental principles of international relations: respect for sovereignty and diplomatic solutions.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com


