[Wang Son-taek] Maduro case: the erosion of rule-based order

The United States’ decision to indict Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on narcoterrorism charges and to subject him to forcible trial procedures is not merely a question of criminal justice or bilateral diplomacy. It raises a far more consequential issue: how a hegemonic power treats international law, and what happens to global stability when that law is selectively ignored. At stake is not the character of one leader or the legitimacy of one regime, but the integrity of the international legal order itself. From an international law perspective, the abduction and forced prosecution of a sitting head of state constitutes a multilayered violation of foundational legal principles. Unfortunately, the core legal issues at stake have not been clearly understood. They therefore warrant careful clarification.

First, the action violates the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter. Sovereign equality is the cornerstone of the modern international order. It means that all states, regardless of size or power, are legally equal and none may exercise authority over another. When one state unilaterally designates another state’s president as an object of arrest and trial, the horizontal structure of sovereignty collapses. Sovereignty becomes conditional, applied according to power rather than law.

Second, the operation violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. This provision does not apply only to declared wars. It bans any use of armed force that undermines the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. Military or paramilitary operations conducted on foreign soil for the purpose of apprehending a head of state clearly fall within the scope of prohibited force, regardless of whether they are framed as “law enforcement” actions.

Third, the act constitutes a violation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Criminal justice, constitutional authority and the composition of a country’s leadership are core internal affairs. Direct interference with these elements through coercive means represents one of the forms of unlawful intervention.

Fourth, the prosecution disregards the customary international law principle of head-of-state immunity. Under longstanding and widely recognized international practice, sitting heads of state are generally immune from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by foreign domestic courts. This immunity is not a moral endorsement of misconduct but a functional necessity that allows states to coexist, communicate and resolve disputes without fear of judicial warfare.

Fifth, the case bypasses legitimate international judicial procedures. If crimes of an international nature are alleged, established multilateral mechanisms exist, including the International Criminal Court or referral through the UN Security Council. Even though the United States is not a party to the ICC, the existence of multilateral judicial mechanisms underscores that unilateral enforcement is not the default or legitimate option. Circumventing these avenues in favor of unilateral action undermines the procedural norms that distinguish law from power.

Supporters of the US position may raise several counterarguments. One is that Maduro is not a legitimate head of state but the leader of a criminal enterprise, and therefore not entitled to immunity. Another is that narcoterrorism constitutes an international crime subject to universal jurisdiction. A third is that the action represents a form of defensive law enforcement necessary to protect American society from grave transnational harm.

Yet these arguments fail to withstand legal scrutiny. No state has the authority to unilaterally determine the legitimacy of another state’s leadership for the purpose of nullifying immunity. If such judgments were sufficient, the doctrine of head-of-state immunity would effectively cease to exist. International law would be replaced by political labeling. Moreover, “narcoterrorism” is not an independently codified international crime under treaty law comparable to genocide or war crimes. Universal jurisdiction applies only in narrowly defined circumstances. Expanding it through creative reinterpretation risks eroding its legal coherence. The claim of self-defense is equally problematic. Under the UN Charter, self-defense applies only in response to an actual or imminent armed attack. Criminal activity, however serious, does not meet this threshold. To equate social harm with armed attack is to stretch the concept of self-defense beyond recognition.

The broader consequences of this approach are even more troubling. When a hegemonic power disregards international law, its leadership weakens rather than strengthens. Global leadership rests not only on military and economic capabilities but on credibility and trust. A rules-based order depends on the belief that rules apply consistently, especially to those powerful enough to ignore them. Selective adherence to international law creates systemic instability. It signals that norms are optional and that force may substitute for procedure. This does not deter misconduct; it multiplies it.

Worse still, such precedents provide implicit justification for other violations of international law. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, widely condemned as an illegal use of force, rests on arguments of necessity, security and moral exceptionalism. When powerful states normalize unilateral legal exceptions, they weaken the very standards used to condemn aggression elsewhere. Authoritarian powers are particularly attentive to such precedents. If international law can be set aside by one hegemon in the name of justice or security, others will follow suit under different banners. The result is not order but fragmentation — a world in which legality is defined by capability.

The Maduro case therefore transcends Venezuela and the United States. It poses a question to the international community: whether international law remains a shared framework or becomes a discretionary tool of the powerful. When procedure is abandoned, justice loses its meaning. Today’s exception becomes tomorrow’s norm. Respect for international law is not a constraint on American power, but the condition for its legitimacy and durability. It is the most practical form of self-restraint in an increasingly unstable world. For hegemonic powers, it is not a burden but a responsibility. Without it, leadership erodes, insecurity spreads and the line between law and force disappears.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.