[Lee Byung-jong] Korea’s unfit ambassadors

For South Korea’s newly elected presidents, ambassadorship has long been an ideal gift to bestow on friends and loyalists. Unlike other top government posts, ambassadorial positions do not require tough parliamentary confirmation hearings or extensive public scrutiny. This made them convenient rewards in the past, when military dictators handed out ambassadorships to fellow generals who supported their coups or autocracies. In more recent years, presidents have given these posts to politicians and professors who supported their election campaigns.

The latest example is President Lee Jae Myung’s appointment of his former bar-exam classmate as ambassador to the United Nations. The new envoy, Cha Ji-hoon, has no diplomatic background but received one of Korea’s most important posts largely because they trained together after passing the bar. He is one of several high-profile officials drawn from Lee’s bar-exam cohort, a group that also includes the justice minister, the minister for government legislation and the governor of the Financial Supervisory Service. Several other lawyers who defended President Lee in his legal cases also received key government positions, inviting criticism of favoritism and nepotism.

The Lee administration argues that Ambassador Cha has some international experience and speaks English well. But at a time when global geopolitics are increasingly volatile and dangerous — marked by intensifying great-power rivalry and a looming trade war driven by US President Donald Trump’s steep tariffs — the post at the UN, the world’s most important international organization, requires far more than modest international exposure and language proficiency. Korea’s current seat on the UN Security Council only heightens the need for seasoned diplomatic leadership.

Political appointments of ambassadors are not unique to Korea. The United States fills nearly a third of its ambassadorial posts with individuals who backed successful presidential campaigns, often major donors or personal associates. But as the world’s dominant power, the US can afford this practice. Their ambassadors’ personal ties to the president, the most powerful person in the free world, are often viewed as assets by host governments. They need not speak the local language because English functions as the lingua franca of diplomacy. Moreover, US ambassadors must still undergo rigorous Senate confirmation.

For smaller countries like Korea, however, the situation is very different. Korean ambassadors must work harder to gain the attention of host governments, given Korea’s more limited global influence. Competing with top envoys from other nations requires deep knowledge of local politics and economics, as well as a firm grasp of rapidly evolving global affairs. Familiarity with diplomatic protocol and practices is essential. Because Korean is not widely spoken overseas, proficiency in English is crucial for effective diplomacy.

Yet Korea has had its share of unsuitable ambassadors, many of them political appointees. Some were academics who advised presidential candidates on foreign policy during campaigns. They may excel at crafting policy ideas but not necessarily at executing them. Lacking expertise in the host country or strong language skills, some were even regarded with suspicion or indifference by local governments. In several cases, they struggled to gain access to key officials.

There have been notable exceptions. A few professors-turned-ambassadors, backed by extensive experience both inside and outside government, have demonstrated exceptional diplomatic skill. Former UK Ambassador Lee Hong-koo and former US Ambassador Han Seung-soo are widely regarded as such. Their deep academic backgrounds and long public service careers ultimately led them to the premiership.

Politicians-turned-ambassadors, however, have generally performed more poorly. Many were posted to key countries like China or Japan, despite lacking expertise in international affairs. In extreme cases, ambassadorships served merely to bolster their resumes for future elections. Others used the posts as comfortable preretirement assignments, granted as rewards for supporting presidential campaigns.

A new concern has arisen under the current Lee administration. For reasons that remain unclear, many ambassadorial posts are now vacant. Roughly 20 positions — including those in London and Paris — remain unfilled. Numerous ambassadors appointed by the previous administration were asked to resign immediately after Lee took office, yet replacements have been slow to materialize. The delay may reflect difficulty identifying qualified candidates, or it may stem from a prolonged search for political loyalists or noncareer diplomats. Either way, extended vacancies are risky in an era of growing geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainty.

Two recent incidents highlight the dangers of these prolonged gaps. One was the exposure of a deadly international crime ring in Cambodia involving numerous Korean victims and perpetrators. With the ambassador’s post in Phnom Penh vacant, the government’s initial response was sluggish and uncoordinated. Another case involved the detention and deportation of Korean workers at Hyundai and LG factories in the US state of Georgia by immigration authorities. Because the Atlanta consul general post was vacant at the time, critics argue that Korea’s response was slow and inadequate. Like ambassadors, consuls general play a critical role in safeguarding Koreans abroad.

This does not mean the government should rush to fill these posts. What Korea needs most urgently is not speed but qualified ambassadors. The last thing the country needs is another politically connected appointee with no meaningful diplomatic competence.

Lee Byung-jong

Lee Byung-jong is a former Seoul correspondent for Newsweek, The Associated Press and Bloomberg News. He is a professor at the School of Global Service at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.