South Korea and the United States must rethink their approach to security, rooted in outdated assumptions that no longer reflect fundamental shifts in Northeast Asia, according to a report released Tuesday by a Washington-based think tank.
Titled “Old Assumptions, New Realities: Rethinking US-Korea Policies,” the report was published by the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a Washington-based think tank that advocates military restraint and diplomacy.
The report identified North Korea's expanding nuclear capabilities, the intensifying US-China rivalry and Russia's war in Ukraine as major shifts reshaping Northeast Asia's security landscape. It described a region increasingly divided into competing blocs, with Washington, Seoul and Tokyo drawing closer while Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang deepen ties.
The growing polarization has complicated diplomacy and exposed diverging priorities within the South Korea-US alliance: Washington is focused on countering China, while Seoul remains primarily concerned with deterring North Korea.
“The policy frameworks and strategic assumptions that have guided Washington and Seoul for many years are out of step with the realities they now confront,” James Park of the institute's East Asia program wrote in the introduction.
Bringing together eight South Korean and US experts, the report challenges longstanding assumptions shaping Washington and Seoul's policies toward North Korea, China and their military alliance.
“A common conclusion that emerges from these essays is that Washington and Seoul desperately need to expand the range of choices available to them,” Park underlined. . “Conventional wisdom from years past is simply inadequate.”
Reframing North Korea as nuclear deterrence challenge
Washington should replace denuclearization as its immediate goal with managing a long-term nuclear deterrence relationship with Pyongyang, according to Ankit Panda, a Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Panda argued that North Korea, like Russia and China, can now credibly threaten the US with nuclear weapons, requiring Washington to manage a third nuclear deterrence relationship.
“North Korea is no longer a nonproliferation problem sitting at the periphery of US strategy; it is a deterrence problem embedded in the most dangerous nuclear environment the United States has confronted since the height of the Cold War,” Panda said.
Panda estimated that Pyongyang possesses roughly 50 assembled nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for at least 90 to 100, but lacks the crisis communication mechanisms and strategic dialogue Washington has developed, to varying degrees, with Russia and China.
“The incoherence between simultaneously seeking denuclearization and failing to center nuclear deterrence has unnecessarily allowed risks to accrue,” he underlined.
Northeast Asian security dialogue without denuclearization preconditions
John Delury, a resident professor of international politics at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center, proposed establishing a standing regional security dialogue regardless of progress toward North Korean denuclearization.
“Shorn of the unattainable goal of denuclearization, the original idea can be reformulated as a more durable institutional design: a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Dialogue,” Delury wrote.
South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Mongolia would rotate hosting annual ministerial meetings, with the United States and Russia participating as full dialogue partners.
“Including the United States and Russia — and China, for that matter — would compel the great powers to present their case in a common space, making it harder for them to dictate hegemonic terms to smaller and middle powers as in a one-to-one format,” he wrote.
Delury also identified President Lee Jae Myung as a potential leader of the initiative.
Security cooperation with China for Seoul's strategic autonomy
Park Kyu-ri, an assistant professor at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand, called for strengthening security cooperation with China while maintaining deterrence through the US alliance.
“The alliance with the United States remains the cornerstone of South Korea’s defense, but Seoul should use every available instrument of statecraft to shape its own security environment,” Park wrote.
Park cited renewed maritime search-and-rescue cooperation between Seoul and Beijing in the disputed Yellow Sea as an example of confidence-building amid strategic rivalry.
Park's research on joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region from 1970 to 2024 found that 87 percent of exercises involving China and regional countries focused on reassurance and confidence-building, including search-and-rescue and antipiracy operations.
Park also pointed to concerns over the possible redeployment of US missile defense assets to the Middle East as evidence of the risks of relying exclusively on Washington.
“South Korea should resist simply mirroring the structure of the US–China rivalry and instead pursue an independent networking strategy that advances its own strategic interests,” she said.
Two allies, two commands
Jun Jae-woo, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul, proposed replacing the South Korea Korea-US Combined Forces Command with parallel national commands.
“When priorities diverge, an integrated command becomes a mechanism that subordinates the weaker ally to the stronger one’s strategic aims,” Jun said.
Jun argued that reorienting US forces in South Korea toward China could make the peninsula a target during a Taiwan conflict.
“Reorienting USFK toward China gives Beijing a reason to strike the peninsula that it does not otherwise have,” he said.
Jun proposed transferring wartime operational control to South Korea and establishing parallel commands within four years. Seoul would lead conventional defense, while Washington retained nuclear extended deterrence, its military presence and continued military cooperation.
“This redesign would not be a concession by either side,” Jun said. “Seoul would gain the autonomy it has sought without leaving the alliance; Washington would gain latitude it does not now have, an end to a recurring quarrel and a nonproliferation order left intact.”
Washington's alliance blind spot
Jeffrey Robertson, an associate professor of diplomatic studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, criticized mainstream Washington think tanks for relying on entrenched assumptions about South Korea that cause them to overlook political change and dismiss scenarios outside conventional expectations.
Robertson cited South Korea's growing nuclear weapons debate, deepening political polarization and former President Yoon Suk Yeol's December 2024 martial law declaration as developments of which mainstream analysts largely overlooked the warning signs.
Robertson pointed out that the problem was not a lack of information, but the failure to recognize evidence that contradicted established assumptions, a tendency reinforced by reliance on English-language sources and narrow expert networks.
“The problem emerges when analytical frameworks become analytical prisons,” he said.
“On Korean Peninsula issues, mainstream Washington think tanks hold a near obsession with ‘strengthening’ or ‘modernizing’ the alliance with Seoul and a commensurate unwillingness to contemplate its end,” he added.
Robertson urged analysts to examine unconventional scenarios, including questions about a future without the alliance.
“What would the bilateral relationship look like beyond the alliance? How could US national interests be pursued in the absence of an alliance? What role would South Korea play in East Asia in the absence of an alliance?” he wrote. “Such questions remain outside the realm of possibility in mainstream think tanks.”
dagyumji@heraldcorp.com


