I have observed Korea-US relations for decades, both in Korea and in the US. Differences are inevitable. What concerns me today is how quickly individual disputes become judgments about the alliance itself, while strategic changes that fall outside Washington’s expectations receive less attention.

For Korea, the test is straightforward: Does the alliance protect our security, prosperity and ability to make our own decisions? We need to understand American strategy to answer that question and to negotiate effectively. Understanding it does not mean accepting every American demand.

Recent visa difficulties involving Korean politicians, differing interpretations of wartime operational control and restrictions on certain intelligence sharing deserve attention. But we should not base our assessment of the alliance on these controversies. We must first examine the broader direction, then address each problem in context.

The 2025 US National Security Strategy links American security and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific’s economic and military balance. It emphasizes deterrence, resilient supply chains and greater allied contributions, and it urges Korea and Japan to develop capabilities to help protect the First Island Chain.

The 2026 US National Defense Strategy outlines four priorities: defending the American homeland, deterring China, increasing allied responsibility and rebuilding the US defense industrial base. It also seeks to avoid unnecessary confrontation with Beijing. Korean policymakers need to read these priorities together and consider their implications for Korea.

One passage warrants particular attention. The strategy envisages Korea taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, with “critical but more limited US support.” What will that support entail? What capabilities must Korea develop? How will extended deterrence and regional contingencies be addressed? These questions demand answers.

An American strategy document outlines Washington’s intentions. Alliance arrangements must still be worked out jointly. Seoul should neither assume abandonment whenever American policy changes nor accept a new division of responsibilities without assessing the consequences. Our government must negotiate arrangements that strengthen Korea’s defense.

The $350 billion investment framework includes $150 billion for shipbuilding and $200 billion in strategic investment. Korea brings capital, technology and industrial experience. We should leverage these strengths to secure sound projects and opportunities for Korean companies.

MASGA, or “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again,” is one example. Korean shipbuilding expertise can contribute to shipyard modernization, workforce development, maintenance, repair and overhaul, as well as to supply chain reliability. Helping restore American capacity can benefit Korea, provided that the arrangements strengthen our industry and shared security.

US approval for Korea to build nuclear-powered attack submarines is another opportunity. Next steps include fuel, legal requirements, industrial participation and operations. Nuclear propulsion is distinct from nuclear armament. Approval matters, but practical arrangements will determine whether Korea acquires a useful and sustainable capability.

Having studied and conducted business in the United States, I have learned the importance of understanding how Americans define their national interests.

Korea’s case is stronger when we can explain how cooperation benefits both countries. Our government and industry should enter negotiations with a clear understanding of Korea’s needs and what it can offer.

Korean investment in the United States must pass feasibility tests, safeguard financial stability and deliver reasonable returns. Political enthusiasm cannot replace commercial judgment. The National Assembly should scrutinize these arrangements while helping sustain worthwhile commitments beyond a single administration, recognizing that Korean businesses and taxpayers will bear the risks.

China complicates matters.

Korea has legitimate reasons to maintain commercial ties with Beijing. At the same time, we must recognize that China is not a security ally. Seoul needs to explain how its economic relationship with China aligns with its alliance commitments and economic security needs.

Washington should understand Korea’s economic exposure. Leaving expectations unclear until a crisis arrives would serve neither country. Navigating the shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific requires a sound strategy and the political will to put national interests above partisan loyalties.

Wartime operational control falls within this broader context. Stronger Korean leadership requires capabilities and agreed-upon verification of readiness. A political deadline cannot establish military preparedness. Likewise, changing threats cannot justify indefinite postponement without explanation. Both governments must demonstrate how the transition will improve combined defense.

Visa cases and intelligence restrictions require different responses. Facts should be established through official channels. Sensitive information must be protected, and legitimate parliamentary exchanges must be supported. Public accusations before clarification can make disputes harder to resolve and distract officials from consequential work.

North Korea leaves us little room for distraction. September’s mine incident, missile launches, border fortification and artillery displays underscore the pressure facing the alliance. Whatever Pyongyang intends, we must ensure it does not mistake political disagreement for a weakening of our collective capacity to respond.

Lawmakers and senior officials in both countries should remember that their words carry responsibilities beyond personal opinion. Remarks intended for supporters are heard by allied commanders and adversaries alike. Firm disagreement is sometimes necessary, but its purpose must be to advance national interests rather than to defend a party or a particular leader.

Korean leaders must protect Korea’s interests, just as American leaders must protect America’s.

Those interests will not always align. That is why we need an alliance capable of managing differences with mutual respect. Strategic composure means knowing what we want, understanding our partner and doing the detailed work to reach agreements that our citizens can trust.

Man-Ki Kim

Man-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yoon & Yang. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed


herald@heraldcorp.com