The early presidential election is the biggest concern in South Korea at the end of April. South Korea's presidential election was originally scheduled for March 2027. Still, the election will take place about two years earlier than that, with former President Yoon Suk Yeol having been removed for declaring illegal and unconstitutional martial law.

However, there is another typhoon-like issue pending in Korea. It is the criminal trial of Yoon on insurrection charges. The trial examines whether Yoon's martial law declaration constitutes a crime of insurrection. The initial issue focuses on whether Yoon indeed ordered the military to drag the lawmakers out of the National Assembly during Yoon's martial law. While he denies it, some soldiers either avoid commenting on the matter or deny it. Nevertheless, others are saying Yoon gave the order. To compare their responses, we have no choice but to contemplate for whom the soldiers stand.

The most notable point is that the general-level officers speak vaguely, while the field-level officers speak explicitly. At the trial, Lt. Col. Kim Hyung-ki, commander of the Army Special Warfare Command's 1st Special Forces Brigade, testified that Yoon ordered lawmakers to be dragged out of the National Assembly building by force. He added, "I am not loyal to a person; I am just loyal to the organization and the country." This remark drew attention because it was originally made by Yoon himself 12 years ago during an investigation into a major political scandal. With this remark, Yoon built an image of a strong-arm prosecutor against external pressure and ultimately became the starting point for him to enter politics and win the presidential election. He could not have known that his remark would later be used to criticize him. Lawyers for Yoon raised the possibility that the order was justifiable to Lt. Col. Kim to maintain order. However, Lt. Col. Kim dismissed the idea, saying, "It was not the duty of the military to maintain order in the National Assembly."

Col. Cho Sung-hyun, commander of the 1st Security Group of the Capital Defense Command, gave similar testimony. Although he was indeed ordered to enter the National Assembly, he instructed his men not to cross the bridge into the area where the National Assembly is located. Lawyers for the former president questioned Cho about the validity of his testimony, asking if it was possible to drag the lawmakers out of the National Assembly. Cho reaffirmed that he had received such an order, confirming his position that it was wrong to give orders that were impossible to fulfill.

Sensing that Yoon's instructions were wrong, these field commanders bought time by delaying passing them on to their subordinates. They chose the middle point because soldiers have to obey the orders from the top, but they did not want to violate the principles of democracy. In addition, Col. Kim Moon-sang, former chief of operations for Capital Defense Command, refused three times to allow the martial law force helicopters into Seoul's airspace, delaying their arrival at the National Assembly more than 40 minutes on the night of Yoon's martial law declaration Dec. 3, securing time for thousands of citizens to gather around the Assembly.

General-level officers' answers on whether Yoon ordered the lawmakers to be dragged out of the Assembly were ambiguous. Lieutenant General Lee Jin-woo, former commander of the Capital Defense Command, replied that he had not received such an order. His denial is completely opposite to the responses of his men. Lieutenant General Yeo In-hyeong, former commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command, chose not to speak at Yoon's impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court. Lieutenant General Kwak Jong-geun, former commander of the Army's Special Warfare Command, was the only general-level officer to testify that the former president gave the order.

Field commanders perceived Yoon's illegal and unconstitutional orders as wrong on the spot and reached a compromise by delaying their implementation. Thanks to these delays, democracy in the Republic of Korea was protected. Without these decisions, the insurrection on Dec. 3 is likely to have been successful. If the helicopters carrying the special forces had arrived 40 minutes earlier, if the Capital Defense Command soldiers had crossed the bridge to the National Assembly and if the special forces had quickly implemented Yoon's order to drag out all the lawmakers, the National Assembly would not have been able to adopt the resolution to annul Yoon's martial law declaration. Democracy in the Republic of Korea would have died that night.

In contrast, general-level officers tried to fulfill most of Yoon's illegal orders and have often refused to tell the truth after his martial law attempt failed. Why is there such a difference here? There is an age difference between generals and field commanders. South Koreans in their mid-50s and mid-40s may have different basic assumptions about liberal democracy. There is another essential feature: Generals are all elite officers from the military academy, while all of the field commanders are not from the academy. They can be evaluated as being loyal to the country, not to an individual. Then, was having graduated from the military academy a variable in officers' attitudes toward Yoon's unconstitutional martial law and illegal military operation orders? There is a good chance that it is. Kim Yong-hyun, the former defense minister who helped Yoon to lead the insurrection in general, promoted his juniors at the military academy to three-star generals and assigned them the primary duties to realize the insurrection. All three-star generals tried to fulfill their seniors' illegal orders, and after the martial law attempt failed, they chose not to tell the truth except for one general. They view that the object of loyalty is not the country but a specific individual who helped them advance their careers.

It is both disappointing and alarming that high-ranking officers displayed such moral weakness and were ignorant about the principles of liberal democracy. And yet, this crisis also revealed a hopeful truth: that many in the military — especially younger officers and those from the nonmilitary academy — understand that loyalty to the people of the country must outweigh loyalty to any one person. With these smart and mature officers, the Korean people can place their trust in their democracy as it is strong and sustainable.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.