The disappearance of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi has precipitated a new crisis in US-Saudi relations. Yet that crisis has also revived a much older dilemma in American strategy: How to deal with allies that also happen to be morally abhorrent, even murderous, dictatorships.

The rapid spread of democracy from the 1970s through the early 2000s eased this dilemma, by aligning the frontiers of freedom more closely with the frontiers of America’s European and Asia-Pacific alliances. Yet the problem has now returned, and not just in the Middle East, because of two factors.

The first is the “democratic recession” that began around 2006, and which has subsequently weakened democracy in dozens of countries around the world. Illiberal and anti-democratic practices have taken hold in key NATO countries: Turkey, Poland and Hungary. In the Asia-Pacific region, one US ally -- Thailand -- has been under military rule since 2014, while another -- the Philippines -- has reverted to a bloody form of illiberal democracy under Rodrigo Duterte. In the Middle East, George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda and the hopes of the Arab Spring have faded; authoritarianism and instability are again the status quo.

The challenge of handling these friendly authoritarians is greater because of the second trend: the resurgence of geopolitical revisionism. As hostile authoritarian powers -- China, Russia and Iran -- challenge existing regional orders across Eurasia, they are putting US power and influence under pressure and sharpening the dilemmas America faces in handling its more autocratic allies.

There have traditionally been two schools of thought on coping with this problem. One was expressed most forcefully by Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose famous article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” was published in 1979 and vaulted her to the forefront of US policymaking during the Ronald Reagan years.

Kirkpatrick argued that insisting that authoritarian allies adhere to US standards of political freedom and individual rights was an invitation to disaster. It would destabilize those regimes internally, raising the likelihood of a takeover by more radical and hostile forces.

The second school of thought, expressed most prominently by Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, held that choice between interests and ideals was a false one. Supporting dictators was no guarantee of stability, because those regimes provoked hatred and discontent that could eventually erupt into revolution.

Even supposedly friendly dictators could prove dangerous and unpredictable, as the Argentine junta showed when it invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982 and triggered a war with the UK. The US could not promote democracy and confront authoritarians everywhere, Shultz acknowledged. But generally speaking, spreading human rights and democracy, while holding friendly authoritarian regimes to account, was a geopolitical imperative as well as a moral one.

Shultz’s view won out in the Reagan administration, which played a critical supporting role in the triumph of democratic forces in countries from the Philippines and South Korea to El Salvador and Chile. Yet because democracy was spreading like wildfire in the 1980s, and because the Soviet threat was starting to fade, the choices were in many ways less difficult for US policymakers than they are now. Today, Washington can usefully embrace insights from both schools of thought.

From the Kirkpatrick school comes the hard truth that the US can’t afford a break with many of its authoritarian allies today. If holding the line against Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific region seems hard now, just wait until the already-weak US alliance with the Philippines falls apart. Putting relations with Turkey, Poland or Hungary into a deep freeze might be morally satisfying; it would also create more opportunities for Russian mischief on NATO’s eastern flank.

In the Middle East, the US-Saudi partnership remains important for counterterrorism cooperation and as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions. Isolating Saudi Arabia might push Riyadh to deepen its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Iran, Russia and China are seeking to expand their influence by weakening the strength and cohesion of US alliances: Washington should not do its rivals’ work for them.

Yet neither should America do what the Trump administration often seems included to do: Give its allies a green light to violate human rights and flout the rule of law. Doing so simply gives incentive for further misdeeds. It erodes US moral standing by leaving Washington vulnerable to charges of selective morality and outright hypocrisy. And it weakens the liberal ideological glue that helps bind the US to its closest allies; it creates ideological affinities between Washington’s friends and its rivals; it raises the longer-term dangers of serious domestic instability and even revolution.

The US must therefore exact a cost, measured but real, on the illiberal actions of its allies. This could mean reducing -- but not fully halting -- arms sales, speaking out more strongly against repressive behavior and perhaps even excluding quasi-authoritarian allies such as Hungary from NATO exercises. Also helpful would be quiet but consistent advocacy of respect for basic human rights, and -- where feasible -- increased support for embattled democratic actors.

Above all, the US must avoid conveying its approval of or simple indifference to illiberal practices. Unfortunately, President Trump has repeatedly done just this, by praising Duterte’s vicious drug war, by singling out a backsliding Poland for praise in major international speeches, by uncritically backing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his power grab in Saudi Arabia, and by cultivating an air of presidential indifference to issues of human rights and democracy. In fairness, the president’s comments that the US would exact punishment on Saudi Arabia if it is proved that Riyadh was responsible for Khashoggi’s disappearance were a good sign in this regard; his pre-emptive public refusal to even consider restricting US arms sales, however, was a very bad one.

Striking the right balance in dealing with friendly dictators will always be difficult. But the US risks compromising its ideals and its interests if it doesn’t even try.


Hal Brands
Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. -- Ed.

(Bloomberg)