It is time to rethink the notion that US strategic and military presence and influence in Asia is declining under Donald Trump. If the United States’ new military base in Pyeongtaek signals anything, the United States will continue to strengthen its military and strategic outreach with its alliance partners in Asia, including South Korea, although selectively. The Trump administration’s selective approach is to put US military and strategic interests ahead of anything else under the “America First” policy.

The Pyeongtaek military base must encourage countries in Asia to reassess US military planning in Indo-Pacific. Formally ending the 73-year-old historical Yongsan Garrison base in Seoul, the United States Forces Korea has opened the base in Pyeongtaek, located in Gyeonggi Province, almost 70 kilometers south of Seoul. 

Aiming to expand USFK’s security role in the Korean Peninsula, the Pyeongtaek base will have its headquarters in Camp Humphreys, showing a renewed commitment to the US-ROK age-old military alliance. The shift of the military base will formally separate the headquarters of the USFK from the United Nations Command.

What does this decision to have this new military base imply for the military balance in the Indo-Pacific region, in terms of US military posturing? The US withdrawal from the TPP and the Trump administration’s demand on Japan and South Korea for cost sharing for military troops’ stationing and establishment expenditures in their respective territories had put in doubt the United States’ military commitment in Indo-Pacific region. The establishment of the new military base should put these doubts to rest. 

This security investment is meant to continue to uphold the US military presence in the Korean Peninsula. Following a business or corporate-oriented model, Trump’s approach is based on the “sharing” model of security mandate. The new base has cost $10.8 billion, of which 90 percent has been covered by the Republic of Korea. The Trump administration is seeking more cost-sharing mechanisms and business-oriented security understanding with several countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan and perhaps with India in the future.

The Pyeongtaek base comes as new security insurance to the US-ROK alliance, which was established in the 1950s. For both alliance partners this comes as a strategic deterrence against North Korea and including China. This military base offers flexibility to the American forces to use different operational tactics in any eventuality. 

The base is a part of the American Global Defense Posture Review, which is essentially a military realignment program to offer greater flexibility to the USFK’s posturing and operations. Though this decision to shift the military base was made in 2003, it confirms the Trump administration’s “selective” and “business-oriented” military strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region.

The present US administration’s military approach toward South Korea is more positive than toward Japan. During the Cold War, a prime target of the American military partnership with Tokyo was to ensure that Japan did not embrace communism. With Trump coming to power in the US, there have been doubts over US-Japan military ties over cost sharing and the US’ commitment toward Japan’s maritime security. Japan’s national motivation under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to revise the pacifist constitution, including Article 9, and strengthening self-defense capabilities have been additional factors in creating doubts over the US-Japan military alliance. 

Tokyo wants to become more independent in military posturing even though it has to overtly continue to rely on the US. Japan is also aiming to establish a more cooperative and stronger defense understanding with India, a special and global partner in the Indo-Pacific region.

The US military assistance to South Korea is to protect US interests in Northeast Asia; while to Japan it is intended more toward the Indo-Pacific region. US troops on the Korean Peninsula number around 28,500. This might decline or increase depending on the understanding that the US administration has with the ROK. 

The US military will also like to consider this with its rotational policy. In Japan, around 40,000 troops were stationed as of the end of 2017. The 7th Fleet of the US is headquartered in Japan and is the largest sea force with approximately 20,000 sailors, 145 aircraft, and a good number of ships and submarines that may number 60-70. These large numbers have compelled the Trump administration to rethink cost-sharing mechanisms with Japan.

Compared to South Korea and Japan, the US military maintains a smaller presence in Southeast Asia. Most of the US military presence in the region is in the Philippines, apart from the American security understanding with Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In order to strengthen its Indo-Pacific military outreach, the Trump administration is slowly revising its military strategy. Hawaii, a US state close to the Korean Peninsula, stations round 40,000 military personnel. This involves huge costs for the US military.

Trump’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region is therefore witnessing a significant change. The renaming of the Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command is a significant development in this context. Many might read this renaming more as a symbolic change, but the renaming undoubtedly is a significant development in the context of troops’ positioning, military posturing and strategy building. 

The renaming factors India as a prominent military partner. The recently postponed India-US 2+2 dialogue has brought to the fore that the Trump administration needs “business” even though the subject is security. The US Indo-Pacific Command has almost 375,000 military and civilians attached.

The Trump administration’s strategy would therefore be how to position the US military better without much military expenditure for the US. The Trump administration’s new military policy stance has particular relevance for South Korea, Japan and India. Asian countries such as South Korea, Japan and India need to read the American military strategy better in order to start thinking more independently on how to cooperate in areas of defense and security.


By Jagannath Panda

Jagannath Panda is research fellow and center head for East Asia at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He is currently a Korea Foundation fellow at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. -- Ed.