Few people outside Germany are familiar with the caricature of themselves that many Germans hold in their minds. Far from the aggressive bully of 20th-century war propaganda, the perfectionist engineer of Madison Avenue car advertisements, or the rule-following know-it-all of the silver screen, the German many picture today is a sleepy-headed character clad in nightgown and cap.
Sometimes clutching a candle, this German cuts a naive, forlorn figure, bewildered by the surrounding world.
This figure is not new. On the contrary, referred to as “Der deutsche Michel” or “the German Michel,” it was popularized in the 19th century as a character whose limited perspective causes him to shun great ideas, eschew change, and aspire only to a decent, quiet, and comfortable life.
But Michel has now made a comeback. And who can blame him? Germany now boasts a booming economy, near full employment, rising wages, and content unions.
What bad news there is -- industrial scandals (like that at Volkswagen), airline bankruptcies, endlessly delayed infrastructure projects -- does little to dampen the general sense of safety and wellbeing enjoyed by Germany’s Michels. The only real threat, it seems, is the world outside Germany’s borders.
In this sense, last autumn’s election campaign was perfectly suited to Germany’s Michels. “A land where we live well and happily,” the campaign slogan of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union, resonated with them. With the exception of the right-wing populist Alternative fur Deutschland, the parties displayed a rote civility and drowsy acceptance of consensus that pacified the electorate.
After the election, the real politicking began, but even then, pains were taken to obscure those activities from Germany’s Michels. Indeed, though party officials had been in place for some time, they waited until the votes were cast before putting their cards on the table, and even then did so behind closed doors. Even the leaks from these closed-door coalition talks were so well managed that they created the illusion that the “Sondierungsgesprache” -- that is, the preparatory talks among party officials -- were politically rather harmless.
But Germany’s political class, like its ordinary Michels, are in denial. The soporific federal elections, the breakdown of coalition talks among the CDU, its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union, the Greens, and the Free Democrats (FDP), and the timid dance between the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) since then all point to a serious deficit in German politics.
The truth is that the various party platforms reveal a shocking lack of imagination and paucity of new ideas. Second-order issues are presented as red lines, with largely technical questions -- for example, about refugee family reunions, a new health insurance scheme no one asked for (Burgerversicherung), or the role of the federal government in funding education – taking center stage.
Considering the state of Europe and the world, these issues seem rather marginal. But the real problem is that they are distracting from larger issues relating to, say, the euro, security and defense, migration, infrastructure, and taxation.
Lacking any forward-looking political visions, German politics has degenerated to tactical plays being carried out by established players. The CDU can live neither with or without Merkel, while the SPD is unsure of itself and fears further political decline. None of this bodes well for a country whose parliament has already been diminished, after these three parties marginalized the opposition and failed to build up new leadership cadres.
The CDU/CSU and the SPD are now pursuing a grand coalition that would keep Germany roughly on the same path it has taken during the last eight years. The 28-page agreement that will allow formal coalition talks to proceed is overly detailed, technocratic, unambitious, and lacks vision.
It is thus unsurprising that, though CDU/CSU and SPD negotiators have touted the deal as a breakthrough, many, especially in the SPD, are unhappy with the outcome, with some calling for renegotiation. The SPD now faces a choice: at its special party congress this weekend, its leaders must decide whether to join yet another grand coalition government that promises more of the same, or move into opposition, probably triggering new elections.
But there is another option, which many have ignored: a CDU-led minority government, with Merkel as chancellor. Freed of stifling coalition agreements with a reluctant SPD or a coldly calculating FDP, Merkel could choose her cabinet based on competence and vision, rather than party politics.
Most important, Merkel could finally tackle the important issues that have fallen by the wayside in recent years. This means cooperating with French President Emmanuel Macron to move the European project forward; modernizing Germany’s public administration system; preparing the labor force for digitization; and tackling immigration issues.
Parliament is integral to success on any of these fronts. Mainstream parties must embrace the kind of open and constructive debate that nurtured parliamentary democracy in the Federal Republic’s early years, rather than remaining focused on political tactics.
Michel may prefer the modest policy initiatives and incrementalism that have characterized Merkel’s chancellorships. But a minority government forced to muster coalitions of the willing to address the critical issues confronting Germany and Europe could escape the constraints of Michel’s expectations, freeing German politics from party tacticians and enabling real and much-needed reform.
In other words, the modicum of political insecurity Germany faces today may well be just what the country needs to give rise to new ideas and voices, and a better future.
By Helmut K. Anheier
Helmut K. Anheier is president and professor of sociology at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. -- Ed.
