The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is headed into a confrontation reminiscent of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. What is the most important lesson for the current crisis from that most dangerous confrontation of the Cold War?
The Cuban crisis did not lead to a nuclear war for two main reasons. First, the United States responded to the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba -- a provocation by Nikita Khrushchev, the then-Soviet leader, and Fidel Castro, the then-Cuban leader -- with the right mixture of firm resolve and diplomatic flexibility which created an opening for both sides to exit the crisis without undue loss of face. The United States did not conduct a preemptive air strike against Cuba, though this was the course of action first recommended to President John Kennedy by a majority of his advisers. Instead, Kennedy chose a naval blockade, a less aggressive yet firm response demonstrating his resolve. Then, as the blockade led to a confrontation that gripped the world in the fear of a nuclear holocaust, Kennedy engaged the Soviets in covert negotiations that eventually led to a face-saving formula for both sides, namely the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba in exchange for the removal of the US Jupiter missiles from Turkey and a US public declaration never to invade Cuba.
Crucial to this successful resolution of the crisis was the fact that neither side misread the other. Although Khrushchev projected an aggressive image with his brinksmanship and rambling speech marked by threats and boasts, the US policymakers correctly “read between the lines” of Khrushchev’s behavior and discerned that the Soviet leader was, at heart, desirous of finding a face-saving way to resolve the crisis. As for the Soviet leaders, they came to realize -- through this gambit to test the resolve of the young American President -- that Kennedy could not be pushed around and thus became willing to end their gambit if a face-saving exit could be found.
As in the Cuban crisis, the United States needs to apply the right mixture of firm resolve and diplomatic flexibility in order to resolve the current Korean standoff. The Trump administration has clearly shown a firm resolve vis-a-vis North Korea’s nuclear and missile program, going so far as to declare “all options” are on the table. If anything, it may have gone a bit too far in this direction, possibly raising fears in Pyongyang of an impending American preemptive strike. President Trump therefore made the right move when he recently said he would be “honored” to meet Kim Jong-un, the North Korean dictator, under the right circumstances. This kind of diplomatic language sends the right message to the fiercely nationalistic Pyongyang regime which lives or dies for its national pride and the “dignity of the Supreme Leader.” This language conveys to Kim that Trump is a dealmaker who is willing to assuage Pyongyang’s pride if that is what is necessary to resolve this crisis. What is necessary in the months to come is more of this mixture of firm resolve and diplomatic flexibility as the US explores what kind of deal can be struck with Pyongyang under what kind of circumstances.
What is also crucial in the months to come is that, as in the Cuban crisis, no side misreads or misjudges the other side. Both Pyongyang and Beijing, as well as Seoul and Tokyo, need to learn how to “read between the lines” of President Trump, a leader reminiscent of Khrushchev in his use of brinksmanship, boasts and threats. Miscalculating Trump’s intentions would be very dangerous for all sides involved. For his own part, Trump could tone down his words that invite misinterpretation, such as his recent remark in a press interview that South Korea needs to pay for the cost of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense deployment, which hurt Washington’s relations with Seoul and which his own national security adviser subsequently revoked. Washington has been dealing with Pyongyang for decades and is entirely accustomed to the North Korean regime’s own fiery rhetoric marked by brinksmanship, boasts and threats. It is imperative that Trump himself learns to see beyond Pyongyang’s rhetoric and correctly judge its intentions. As many seasoned North Korea watchers agree, the horrific regime, for all its provocations and violations of agreements, seems to act in a “rational” way and can be talked to.
As South Korea transitions to a new presidential administration more open to improving relations with North Korea, the prospects for reaching a deal with Pyongyang to peacefully end the current nuclear crisis may be enhanced if the Trump administration applies the aforementioned right mixture of firm resolve and diplomatic flexibility in a way that addresses Seoul’s legitimate concerns.
For this, Trump would need to communicate his intentions clearly in a manner that strengthens the crucial alliance with Seoul and maximizes room for all sides to exit the current crisis without undue loss of face. What that exit formula looks like will be for diplomats to work out but will likely entail the following: an agreement to freeze or curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile program in return for addressing its security and economic needs, conditional on monitoring by outside parties to verify compliance and progress. As with the Iran nuclear deal, any deal will be difficult and, if reached, highly controversial. The case for a deal, however, is compelling, as the alternative is drifting further into an ever more serious crisis as Pyongyang advances further in its weapons program.
By Lee Jong-soo
Lee Jong-soo is the senior managing director at Brock Securities LLC and a center associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. The opinions expressed in this piece are solely his own. He can be followed on Twitter at @jameslee004. -- Ed.
