The cordiality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Vientiaine hasn’t quite airbrushed the continuing discord between China and the Southeast Asian nations, notably Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan over the South China Sea. Despite the ruling given by the International Court of Justice at The Hague, the tension over the mastery of the choppy waters might fester for some time yet, going by two developments. China has sent what they call a “coded warning” to the United States to stay out of the dispute.
This is unwarranted as America is not directly involved. The other development in the season of regional bonhomie is the signal from the Philippines, articulating its “grave concern” over the alarmist maritime reality — Chinese boats are preparing to build structures at a disputed shoal in the South China Sea. The accusation makes a travesty of this week’s diplomatic peace in Vientiane. To convince the regional leaders, the authorities in Manila have come up with what they call empirical evidence, most importantly photographs and a map showing Chinese vessels near Scarborough Shoal, which China had seized after a standoff in 2012.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s assurance to the regional heads of government that Beijing is anxious to work with other countries to “dispel interference” in the contested maritime zone has cut no ice; the countries at the center of the dispute remain ever so unconvinced. The statement is obviously intended to counter the Philippines’ claim. Despite the muscle-flexing on both sides of the divide, there was surprisingly no reference during the talks to the ICJ’s ruling in July, invalidating China’s claims to the waterway.
Though Beijing’s maritime strategy has effectively been binned, there has been no indication over the past two months to suggest that Xi’s China is willing to play on the backfoot. Far from it. The court has declared some of China’s artificial islands illegal and invalidated its claims to almost the entire waterway. Logically, this is a critical initiative towards resolving the dispute. Yet China’s intransigence, that has been reflected in course of the Vientiaine summit, runs counter to the certitudes of international law.
Though the United States is not directly involved in the dispute, China’s “coded warning” against possible intervention is an attempt to up the ante, in the context of the ICJ verdict and in the midst of the ASEAN summit. The risk of being branded as an outlaw is dangerously real if China refuses to abide by the court verdict. This will doubtless undermine its claim to regional leadership as a responsible power. Overall, the ASEAN summit has skirted the thorniest issue before the high table.
