The Brexit vote was a political earthquake because the referendum was not expected to pass. The results have been analyzed many times over and a number of theories have been offered to explain what happened.

The vote was close, with 52 percent voting to leave the EU and 48 percent voting to remain. The results showed sharp regional and generational divisions. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted strongly to remain, whereas England and Wales voted to leave. London and most other big cities in England voted to remain, but strong support for leaving in suburban and rural areas overwhelmed that vote. Voters between 18 and 34 voted overwhelmingly to remain, whereas the majority of those over 45 voted to leave.

The division was also sharp according to immigration and class. Areas with a large number of recent immigrants voted remain, whereas areas with lower immigration voted to leave. Educated and wealthier voters voted to remain, whereas less educated and lower income people voted to leave.

Overall, the picture is one of deep division with “the establishment” that benefits from globalization favoring to remain in the EU and those who feel threatened by globalization wanting to leave. The same argument is extended to the current political situation in the U.S. where “the establishment” has coalesced around Hillary Clinton while Donald Trump appeals most to frustrated, older white voters. This theory adds a layer of class conflict to demographic divisions.

Another theory is the identity theory. This theory posits that people vote based on identity rather than self-interest. Taking a political position is not a rational choice, but an identity statement similar to a fashion statement. Applied to the Brexit vote, emotional attachment to Britain explained the vote to leave, despite the risks and problems involved.

Likewise, politics in the U.S. is changing as identity becomes more important. This has created a situation where people with similar lifestyles adopt similar attitudes in politics. Ann Arbor, the quintessential college town where I live, used to have an even division between Democrats and Republicans, but the local Republican Party collapsed in the early 2000s because people no longer identified with the party. The spread of social networking services in the 2010s has exacerbated this trend because it strengthens bonds among “like-minded” people.

But these trends are not limited to the U.K. and the U.S. Slow economic growth, aging populations, and varying degrees of deindustrialization in most of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries since 2000 has created similar trends in most nations. These trends were somewhat delayed in Korea, but are beginning to make themselves felt.

The most important variable governing reactions to these changes is generation. In the U.K. and the U.S., older generations are looking to turn back the clock to an imaginary golden age before things went “bad.” The younger generation that came of age after the 2000s, by contrast, wants action to overcome the malaise. This, more than anything else, explains why younger voters in the U.K. wanted to stick with the EU to avoid the negative consequences of Brexit. Younger voters in the U.S. were the strongest supporters of social democrat Bernie Sanders because his policies offered the hope of a fairer society. Though seemingly contradictory, the thread running through these choices is how group identity drew on anxiety and hope to define the choices and influence voting.

Looking into the future, the size of the younger generation offers insight. The U.K. is aging like the rest of Western Europe, but at a slower rate. The younger generation will most likely carry its pro-EU stance with it as it ages, which suggests that the U.K. may choose to rejoin the EU eventually.

The U.S., meanwhile, is aging even more slowly than the U.K. and will be hungry for change in 2020 and beyond. The U.S. also has a larger percentage of nonwhite voters who are wary of right-wing politics. All of this suggests that the U.S. will continue to move to the left over the next several election cycles.

And Korea? The same combination of anxiety, hope, and group identity drove younger people to the polls and helped give opposition parties control of National Assembly. The trend will mostly continue as the Korean economy stalls and the effects of deindustrialization bite harder.

The problem for Korea is that the population is aging more rapidly than the U.S. or the U.K. There simply may not be enough younger voters to overcome the inherent conservativism of the growing older generation. Here, the politically-aware 386 Generation holds the key because it may end up siding with demands for change even as it moves through its 50s.

By Robert J. Fouser

Robert J. Fouser is a former associate professor of Korean language education at Seoul National University.  -- Ed.