South Korea needs to be cautious about China’s duality in carrying out its external policy, an international relations expert said, noting that Beijing’s diplomacy has increasingly shown an aspect of “realpolitik” and could pose a tricky policy challenge to Seoul.

Kim Tae-ho, professor in the department of international studies at Hallym University of Graduate Studies, also stressed that Seoul should marshal its diplomatic assets to “harmonize” its relations with the U.S. and China, and avoid having to make a choice between the major powers.

“What we should be carefully watching is China’s duality ― a mixture of peaceful declarations and assertive actions: China has declared its peaceful intentions, but it has demonstrated an aspect of ‘realpolitik’ in its foreign policy,” Kim said in a recent interview with The Korea Herald. The professor was referring to realpolitik as China’s growing assertiveness largely in its handling of maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

As for China’s territorial disputes, Kim argued that China may not use force to militarily occupy the disputed islands, given the potential diplomatic repercussions, the presence of the U.S. military and difficulties maintaining military operations in the distant islands.

Touching on China-North Korea relations, Kim said that despite their repeated official emphasis on their traditional friendship, their relationship has not been good, with China recognizing the South as an increasingly crucial partner to secure its practical interests and the North apparently as a strategic liability.

The following is the transcript of the interview with professor Kim. ― Ed.

The Korea Herald: How do you assess the current relations between China and North Korea? Although they often talk about their long-standing, traditional friendship, their relations do not appear to be very good.

Professor Kim: The overall trend vis-a-vis the China-North Korea relations is that their relations and exchanges are managed just on an official level and, in a sense, merely symbolic. Although North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took power three years ago, the two countries have yet to hold a summit. 


Even though the two countries uphold socialism, they are very different countries. If you read the “Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping,” Deng Xiaoping said in reference to Mao Zedong that a leader designating his own successor is a feudalistic act. In Korea, being feudalistic is not regarded as seriously bad. But China founded its nation to construct a “new China” under the slogan of anti-feudalism.

“Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping” is like the guidelines and philosophical books that China’s elites learn by heart. Then, how do you think China would view the hereditary leadership succession in North Korea from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. It doesn’t make sense and is unimaginable for Chinese elites. And now, so-called revolution generations are nowhere to be found.

For China, practical interests come from South Korea, not North Korea. Last year’s trade volume between China and North Korea was around $6.5 billion, while the volume between South Korea and China is $234.5 billion. That is a huge gap. China is South Korea’s largest trading partner while South Korea is China’s third-largest trading partner. Chinese Ambassador to North Korea Li Jinjun said that the friendship between China and North Korea was for good, but that is just a diplomatic statement. Talk of North Korea becoming a strategic liability for China have been around for long, and that is what I often heard each time I visited China.

KH: China has recently introduced various foreign policy initiatives such as the One Belt One Road scheme and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, which many outsiders view as moves to revise the current international order, based on its increasing military and economic prowess. What’s your take on this?

Kim: China has put forward a series of initiatives to play a bigger role in the international community. As a matter of fact, this development is quite desirable. In the past, China did not want to play a bigger role as it did not have the capabilities to do so. Speaking of the AIIB, there are many developing countries in need of foreign assistance for infrastructure construction from organizations such as the AIIB. They may want to rely on the IMF or World Bank, but the two organizations do not have much room for more investment for the developing nations.

The AIIB is expected to have a total capital of $100 billion, while those of the Asia Development Bank and World Bank are around $160 billion and $230 billion, respectively. Thus, I believe China will play a bigger financial role through the AIIB, but this would not overwhelm the existing institutions to allow China to challenge the regional financial order. The U.S. and West have their own stakes in the existing order, and I am skeptical that China would seek to realize its dream by challenging the current international order. I believe China would rather seek coexistence. If China should too openly or explicitly pursue a change in the international order to its own advantage, the U.S. would not just sit back and watch it.

KH: China has been constructing an artificial island in the South China Sea, and its policy regarding maritime disputes seems to be increasingly aggressive. What do you think about China’s intentions behind its increasing assertiveness?

Kim: China has reportedly been constructing an artificial island on Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. China is gradually expanding its influence in the area. But I believe the chances of China using force to occupy disputed islands are not that high. In fact, there were only two cases in which China forcefully overtook a set of disputed islands: one in 1974 and the other in 1988, both in its maritime disputes against Vietnam.

China, of course, is able to deploy and focus its military assets to deal with a contingency in border areas, which means it is capable of militarily occupying a particular target in the Spratly Islands. But the reason why China can’t use force to occupy it is that first, China would face seriously enormous diplomatic repercussions. The second reason is the presence of the U.S. military that wants to stably manage its overseas bases and freedom of navigation at sea. As long as the U.S. military maintains its presence in the region, the range of China’s power projection will be very limited.

Another issue is whether China can project and maintain its military power far beyond its shores. The Spratly Islands is too far. China’s southernmost Hainan Island is some 336 kilometers away from the Paracel Islands, which is some 1,800 kilometers away from Zengmu Reef, the southernmost end of the Spratly Islands. Thus, given the geographical distance, it is difficult for China to project and maintain power all the way to the islands for long periods.

But what we should be carefully watching is China’s duality: China has declared its peaceful intentions, but it has demonstrated an aspect of “realpolitik” in its foreign policy. For instance, in October 2013, China declared its neighborhood diplomacy principles of “qin cheng hui rong” ― meaning the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness. But just a month later, it unilaterally declared its Air Defense Identification Zone (that partially overlaps its neighbors’ ADIZ).

KH: There has been a heated debate about the U.S. potential deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense system to South Korea. What is your opinion about it?

Kim: Some media said that China keeps expressing its opposition to the deployment of THAAD to South Korea merely without fully understanding the technical issues involving THAAD. But, that assumption is totally misplaced. China has run its strategic missile force since 1966, and is fully aware of what THAAD is for and what the S-band radar and X-band radar do.

What China has repeatedly said is that it can hardly understand why South Korea, its friendly neighbor, would like to do things that would undermine the efficacy of its nuclear and missile forces.

KH: Amid an increasing competition between the U.S. and China, South Korea seems to be in a trickier diplomatic position. What is the way forward for Seoul’s diplomacy?

Kim: The U.S. and China are very different from each other in terms of the political system, governing structure, social values, strategic goals, alliance relations and so forth. And these differences are, of course, having a significant impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula. The impact further increased after the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010. From South Korea’s perspective, it cannot help but think of its relations with China when dealing with its relations with the U.S. and vice versa. In the past, handling foreign relations was sort of a simple equation for Seoul, but it is now a higher degree of equation.

One of the arguments that I really hate is that South Korea should keep relations with the U.S. for security purposes, and with China for economic purposes. That is absolutely not appropriate. The U.S. is still a very important economic partner for South Korea, and Washington’s influence in world economic and financial institutions remains great. We also have security issues to cooperate on with China. So again, it is like solving an equation of higher degree. The worst scenario is South Korea facing a tough choice between the U.S. and China. South Korea should never let this happen. It should be able to use and well-manage its relations with both the U.S. and China. How to harmonize its relations with the major powers is one of the biggest policy challenges for Seoul.

KH: China has been increasing its defense spending, which the West thinks could potentially pose a security challenge and criticism has persisted over the country’s lack of transparency in the calculation of its defense outlays. Can you comment on this?

Kim: The U.S. and the West say the level of transparency in China’s military is low because of the lack of transparency in China’s defense budget and its military strategy and doctrines. China’s military strategy has been kept secret as there have not been any official publications detailing its military doctrines.

Speaking of China’s defense budget, China’s defense spending is around $140 billion, while that of the U.S. is some $600 billion. There are many ambiguous things that have not been added to calculate China’s defense budget. For example, China’s military has used its own foreign currency reserves to purchase military equipment from overseas, and this expenditure has not been counted as part of the country’s defense spending. The pension payments for retired soldiers and some other officers come from the Ministry of Civil Affairs. All this suggests that there are many things that have not been added to produce the total amount of China’s defense spending. The West has accused China of concealing the exact defense outlays, but from China’s perspective, it has had its own way of calculating its defense spending.

Whatever the truth is, the arguments over China’s defense spending are very complicated and seem to be endless. What I want to stress is that one should not overestimate or underestimate China’s military capabilities. From the viewpoints of the U.S. and other militarily advanced nations, China still has a long way to go as it has many vulnerabilities to tackle. But from the viewpoints of neighboring nations in East Asia, China is already a militarily advanced nation. So there are gaps in their perception about China’s military status. This year marks the 30th anniversary of China’s military modernization. China’s military is no longer what it was 30 years ago ― in terms of its military capabilities, its defense industry, training and education.

KH: The U.S.-Japan alliance is strengthening with the recent revision of the allies’ defense cooperation guidelines. How do you think China would respond to this? How does Seoul move in this changing security landscape?

Kim: The U.S. currently wants Japan (for security cooperation), and thus it is supporting Japan’s push to become a “normal” state (with a full-fledged military). From 2012, what Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants has been to break away from its postwar system ― imposed upon it after its defeat in World War II. Thus, Japan seeks to expand its Self-Defense Forces’ activities and keeps toying with the idea of rewriting its war-renouncing constitution and exclusively defense-oriented policy.

China cannot just turn a blind eye to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Thus, it seeks to bolster military cooperation with Russia. So this security landscape could impact the security of the Korean Peninsula. Still power politics here take hold, and for a middle-power state to survive, it needs prudence and in-depth thinking. One problem facing South Korea is that Seoul is driven into “resetting” its foreign policy when a new government is sworn in every five years.

KH: When it comes to China threats, the U.S. has talked much of the A2AD (anti-access/area-denial) challenges. What do you think about the core of China’s A2AD capabilities?

Kim: A2AD refers to anti-access/area-denial. In Korea, “area” in this expression has been interpreted as a geographical location. But it is a much more comprehensive meaning that involves ports, airstrips, command and control systems and other major military facilities. The U.S. coined this expression, and A2AD capabilities are referred to as the capabilities to delay, deter and, if possible, defeat the U.S. forces entering the Taiwan Strait in an emergency.

China itself has its own expression, “strategic defense” referring to A2AD. It has quite an offensive aspect. For example, under the strategic defense scheme, China is not only to defend against enemy forces, but also to strike its adversary’s facilities to produce war materials and its operations bases. This means South Korea and Japan where the U.S. has its military installations could become targets in the beginning stages of a war (between the U.S. and China). This is why we should carefully watch the developments regarding A2AD.

KH: Do you think China would continue its “peaceful rise”?

Kim: This issue has become a political, divisive issue in the U.S., a reason why few would like to publicly talk about it. China calls the period of 2000 through 2020 a “strategically important period” during which China has vowed to focus on a “peaceful rise and peaceful development.” Some may say China’s capabilities are growing, but it has no intentions (of challenging the regional status quo). But I am one of the experts who views China’s capabilities as a more important factor than its intentions (in forecasting China’s future direction).

I think we should not jump the gun in answering the question of whether China would remain a status-quo power. China has been benefiting from the U.S.-led international system. Except for the Taiwan issue, China is basically a status-quo power. But the question is until when China will remain a status-quo power. Well, in my view, that will continue until at least 2020. But the question mark hangs over whether China would continue to remain a status-quo power well beyond 2020.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)