Relying on a friend or neighbor for your own security is not something to be proud of. Yet, the decision to delay Seoul’s takeover of the wartime operational control of its troops from the U.S. seems rational given the current security situation on the peninsula, notably the growing nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.

The agreement, which came in a meeting of the two allies’ defense chiefs in Washington on Thursday, did not set the date for the transfer, but South Korean Minister Han Min-koo said it would be in the middle of the 2020s when South Korea would be able to attain defense capabilities to counter the North’s military threats.

The allies said that the decision was made “in light of the evolving security environment in the region, including the enduring North Korean nuclear and missile threat and the need to maintain a strong U.S.-South Korea combined defense posture.”

As they noted, there is ample reason not to make changes to key elements of their alliance, which could weaken their combined defense capabilities.

The North, which conducted its third nuclear test in February last year, threatened early this year that it could conduct a fourth nuclear test, this time in a “new form.” It has also been steadily developing its missile capabilities.

The worst-case scenario is that the North becomes capable of launching a missile with a nuclear warhead. On Friday, the commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea pointed to the potential threat, saying that North Korea was thought to be able to create a nuclear device to be fitted on a missile.

“They’ve had the right connections, and so I believe have the capability to have miniaturized a device at this point, and they have the technology to potentially actually deliver what they say they have,” Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti said.

South Korea still lacks the capability to protect itself from threats like this. Officials said Seoul would be able to take over wartime operational control in the mid-2020s when it gets the “Kill Chain” and Korea Air and Missile Defense systems.

The Kill Chain system is designed to launch preemptive strikes upon detection of imminent nuclear or missile attacks by the North. KAMD is a low-tier missile defense system aimed at keeping Pyongyang’s missile threats in check.

Without these kinds of deterrence against the North, it would be unavoidable for South Korea to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and maintain the current joint deterrence until it acquires capabilities to defend itself.

The issue of wartime operational control has long been a sensitive issue in South Korea, and the latest decision also may well touch off a political row in the South.

Former President Roh Moo-hyun pushed for the transfer of wartime operational control by 2012 despite nuclear threats from the North. He did so in consideration more of his liberal supporters than security realities.

Having decided to delay the transfer for a second time, President Park Geun-hye should face up to the backlash from the liberal bloc. This is more so because she ill-advisedly promised during her 2012 election campaign that if elected, she would stick to the 2015 deadline.

But in the face of the opposition’s demand for her to apologize for breaking her election promise, Park’s spokesman said that there was no change in the government’s position that it should take over wartime control, and that the president had to think about national security. This is a typical play of words.

This devious attitude will not help her win public support for the delay of transferring wartime operational control by at least 10 years. Besides, she also has to address the discontent stemming from the decision to keep the command of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces in Seoul and an artillery brigade in Dongducheon.

The issue of the wartime operational control should be viewed from a security perspective, not an ideological one. What matters is whether we can deter and win a war with the North.