In the latest twist to the nuclear standoff between North Korea and the international community, the two Koreas have held working-level talks between the two governments, and analysts are debating the prospects for any further talks leading to improved inter-Korean relations.

However, although inter-Korean dialogue is certainly preferable to a state of extreme nuclear tension, convincing Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions likely will take more than inter-Korean trust. 

Key to Pyongyang’s denuclearization is improved relations between North Korea and the United States. However, given the current U.S. policy of improved relations with North Korea being contingent on Pyongyang’s denuclearization, better inter-Korean relations per se can do only so much to help attain Pyongyang’s denuclearization.

As North Korea is most likely to continue, either covertly or overtly, its policy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear arms and economic development in the months and years ahead, there is a risk that improved inter-Korean relations may aid North Korea to achieve economic improvement even while Pyongyang further develops its nuclear capability.

Sooner or later, the time will come for North Korea to conduct its next round of nuclear testing and further progress toward possession of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Another phase of tension will then ensue, with new sanctions imposed on North Korea and Pyongyang likely responding with threats of nuclear annihilation.

What can be done to end this vicious circle and strengthen prospects for sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula? While it is incumbent on policymakers in Seoul, Beijing, Washington and other capitals to address this conundrum and work out a creative solution, it seems clear there is more that China can do in the meantime to restrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

If China is serious about working with the United States on Pyongyang’s denuclearization, as agreed to by Xi Jinping and Barack Obama at their summit in California, China needs to exert more effort.

At a minimum, Beijing must restrain Pyongyang from engaging in a repeat of the dangerous nuclear brinksmanship it has displayed in recent months. Beijing can do this now by sending a clear unequivocal message to Pyongyang that the China-North Korea alliance is not designed to protect North Korea in military contingencies brought about by Pyongyang’s own irresponsible nuclear brinksmanship.

It is an open secret that there is ambiguity concerning the nature of the China-North Korean alliance, codified in the Sino-North Korean Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid Treaty originally signed in 1961.

Analysts have debated what this “alliance” covers and what it does not. What seems clear, given both what this treaty states and how Beijing has interpreted it in the recent past, is that this tersely worded treaty is broadly declarative in nature and affords room for differing interpretations of its application to concrete circumstances.

It is significant that the treaty’s stated overall purpose is not just the friendship and mutual aid between China and North Korea but, more importantly, these two nations’ peace and security in the context of regional and world peace.

This can be seen in the fact that the provision of the two nations’ mutual aid in Article 2 comes after Article 1, which declares that the two nations are to strive for regional and world peace as well as the safety of all nations. Moreover, Article 6 clearly states a commitment to peaceful Korean reunification.

It seems evident, therefore, that this treaty does not obligate Beijing to automatically defend Pyongyang in the event of any military hostility on the Korean Peninsula. Much depends on the context behind such hostility, and Beijing apparently reserves to itself the right to determine if it is to intervene militarily on behalf of Pyongyang.

This ambiguity is a source of both flexibility and potential leverage in Beijing’s relations concerning Pyongyang. Beijing should effectively use this potential leverage if its goal is to rein in Pyongyang from a dangerous nuclear brinksmanship with the United States and the international community.

Why is it in Beijing’s interest to rein in Pyongyang? The recent nuclear brinksmanship by Pyongyang probably ratcheted up tensions to a level unacceptable to Beijing’s leaders, as Pyongyang’s threats to attack the United States with nuclear weapons, though not yet credible given Pyongyang’s present lack of such capability, have demonstrated what Pyongyang may be capable of achieving once it actually possesses such capability.

Once Pyongyang attains such capability, assuming that it survives any preemptive strike by the U.S. or South Korea to prevent it from getting to that point, it will essentially be in a position to blackmail the United States into abandoning its South Korean or Japanese allies so as to avoid a North Korean nuclear attack on Los Angeles or New York.

No longer secure in the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, Seoul and Tokyo will then be under intense pressure to develop nuclear weapons of their own. If Seoul and Tokyo become nuclear-armed, a veritable global nuclear arms race will likely unfold eventually, possibly engulfing nations such as Iran, Vietnam, Taiwan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and even Turkey.

The result will be a destabilized world with a severe potential disruption to the security of open sea lanes and global energy supplies on which the global economy depends.

China’s own economy will likely suffer, as will the economy of the United States in which China is already heavily invested with its ownership of over $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities. Under such scenario, China’s economic growth will come to a halt, undermining China’s political stability.

As Pyongyang’s nuclear clock ticks, seemingly more slowly at times such as now but surely and steadily, China has no time to waste. Given the potentially enormous stakes, Beijing would do well to pull out all the punches at its disposal in order to rein in Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions and brinksmanship.

Such punches include not only a sharper definition of its “alliance” with Pyongyang but also measures such as cutting off, or warnings to cut off, China’s supplies of oil, food and investments to its unpredictable “ally.”

A judicious mix of such measures, applied with tact and right amount of pressure on Pyongyang, will be a great test of Beijing’s diplomacy. If implemented successfully, it will be a great triumph of Chinese diplomacy as well as a victory for world peace.

By Lee Jong-soo 

Lee Jong-soo is senior managing director at the Brock Group in New York and author of “The Partition of Korea After World War II: A Global History” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). The opinions expressed in this article are solely his own. ― Ed.