North Korea’s third nuclear test and its threats to conduct more tests this year have ratcheted up tensions in Northeast Asia, with global repercussions. As Pyongyang seems to be inching closer to possessing the ability to deliver nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles, a brewing crisis for the global efforts against WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism threatens regional and global balance of power. 

A time of crisis such as this calls for prudent and skillful crisis management. The leaders of South Korea and China, as well as other major stakeholders including the United States, must recognize the risks of escalation and adopt all sensible preventive measures. They must also be willing to try more flexible and imaginative approaches if their goal is to find a long-term comprehensive solution, not just a short-term fix, to the North Korean conundrum.

First, the new Park administration in South Korea may want to learn from the lessons of the Cold War crisis management such as during and after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. President Park’s crisis decision-making can benefit from having a diverse and experienced group of advisors akin to the group that President Kennedy assembled during the Cuban crisis. It is to be noted that the idea of a naval blockade, proposed by an ex-U.S. Ambassador to Moscow and the approach taken by Kennedy which proved to be successful in the end, was not the majority opinion at first, when the consensus favored a preemptive air strike against Cuba. As the South Korean military studies its options vis-a-vis North Korea, President Park would do well to heed the advice of a diverse group of advisors, both retired and on active duty, in order to broaden her range of options beyond what may seem to be the obvious choices.

Another lesson of the Cuban crisis is the importance of face-saving measures. This is critically relevant to a fiercely proud and nationalistic regime like North Korea. In order to induce Pyongyang to a compromise, all avenues must be explored, including official and unofficial channels, for exchanges of face-saving quid pro quos, either publicly announced or done behind the scenes. Khrushchev agreed to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba only after obtaining a face-saving quid pro quo that included the U.S. public declaration never to invade Cuba and a secret agreement to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey.

Moreover, President Park would do well to consider the idea of proposing a hotline between Seoul and Pyongyang, again similar to that established between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban crisis. Keeping such a line of communication open can prevent miscalculations, heated rhetoric and unintended accidents from escalating into an all-out war.

Second, the leaders of China must clearly recognize the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program and exert all possible leverage they have on Pyongyang in order to stop the situation from spiraling out of control. China must realize that its primary goal in North Korea, that of preventing a sudden collapse of the regime there, is now under grave threat.

As Pyongyang nears a capability to deliver nuclear-tipped missiles, South Korea and the U.S. will come under increasing pressure to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear installations, which can start an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula and bring about North Korea’s collapse. Moreover, a nuclear-armed North Korea, along with China’s rising power and territorial conflicts in East Asia, will exert increasing pressure on Japan, South Korea and other nations including even Vietnam and Taiwan to eventually develop nuclear weapons, a prospect which is clearly abhorrent to both China and other members of the Nuclear Club of nations.

Last but not least, a nuclear-armed North Korea will likely feel more secure and independent of China, with the result that China will have even less leverage over a North Korea that can choose to act increasingly arbitrarily in ways contrary to Beijing’s interests. To find ways to exert maximum leverage on Pyongyang, Beijing would do well to devise imaginative new policy solutions in close coordination with South Korea, the U.S. and other stakeholders.

Third, while squarely addressing the North Korean nuclear threat with a prudent response as outlined above, the new Park administration as well as the broader international community will benefit from exploring all possible avenues to encouraging Pyongyang to open up to the outside world. A main hindrance to North Korea’s liberalization is the country’s extreme restrictions on its people’s freedom of movement and information about the outside world. Any measures promoting people-to-people exchanges such as North Koreans studying or working in the West and more people from the free world visiting North Korea for work or travel would help to bring about change in North Korea, as would any measures to promote more open access to information in North Korea, such as more mobile phone use and access to the Internet. Through all this, more North Koreans would come to possess a more accurate understanding of the outside world and realize that their nation’s self-imposed isolationist policies are self-destructive.

Fourth, the Park administration, while dealing firmly with the North Korean nuclear threat, would do well to offer to expand avenues of economic, cultural and educational engagement with North Korea. Whether or not Pyongyang accepts such gestures, doing this will help to “reset” South Korea’s relationship with the North, which was damaged during the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Ongoing inter-Korean projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the reunions of families separated by the national division need to be strengthened or restarted, and projects under consideration, such as the proposed natural gas pipeline between Russia and South Korea via North Korea, deserve to be implemented. New inter-Korean cooperation on issues where there is a clear consensus ― such as on the disputes with Japan over the Dokdo islets and Japan’s refusal to adequately apologize for its past imperialistic aggressions ― will be easier to tackle and, if successful, help build inter-Korean trust and reconciliation.

Dealing firmly and wisely with the North Korean nuclear threat will require much prudence, flexibility and a willingness to think outside the box. And a longer-term resolution of the North Korean conundrum calls for both the carrot and the stick as well as much else, not least inter-Korean trust and reconciliation.

By Lee Jong-soo

Lee Jong-soo is senior managing director at the Brock Group in New York. The opinions expressed in this article are solely the author’s own. ― Ed.