On May 4, four local government officials were assassinated while travelling by sedan along a road in Saiburi, a district in the southern Thai province of Pattani. Reports say gunmen on a pickup truck opened fire on them with AK-47 and M16 assault rifles.
Given the wave of seemingly random attacks that has swept Thailand’s southern border provinces since the insurgency first erupted in January 2004, the incident seemed almost routine.
Indeed, the rebels are often depicted by government spokesmen as uncoordinated, lacking popular support and reduced to desperate revenge attacks.
But the May 4 attack was no random assault. The assailants made off with 300,000 baht ($9,600) in cash meant to pay the salaries of village defense volunteers. Coordinated attacks against police and military targets are also increasingly common. Clearly, the insurgents are well organized and have access to a sophisticated surveillance network.
Contrast this attention to detail with actions of successive Thai governments in recent years. They have been so preoccupied with the political machinations in Bangkok since the 2006 coup that the problems in the south have been virtually ignored.
The insurgents have made few public demands and their leadership remains obscure. However, the fact that the violence has been concentrated in the southern border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, all of which were once part of the independent Malay-Muslim sultanate of Pattani, has led observers to conclude that it is essentially a separatist movement feeding off decades of misrule by Buddhist Bangkok.
Since taking power in August last year, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has made some effort to change all this. But a combination of official bungling and weak government in Bangkok are likely to ensure that success remains elusive.
The new government has redoubled efforts to improve economic conditions in the south, including the establishment of a special economic zone to stimulate investment. Crucially, officials have also held out the prospect of granting the southern provinces greater autonomy, recognizing the distinct identity of the nation’s Malay Muslims in the process.
Such moves make sense. However, they are unlikely to work. One reason for this is the fact that Yingluck has apparently given her brother Thaksin Shinawatra the authority to negotiate on the government’s behalf.
At a secret meeting reportedly held with exiled Muslim insurgent leaders in Malaysia in the middle of March, Thaksin is said to have expressed regret for the violent incidents carried out by the authorities during his administration, saying he had been “misinformed” about the true situation.
However, the organization believed to have the closest working relationship with armed militants operating on the ground refused to attend. Elders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C), told the Thai Nation newspaper through intermediaries that they ‘could never forgive Thaksin for what he has done to the Malays of Patani’ when he was premier.
They pointed in particular to the Tak Bai massacre of October 2004, and the fact that none of those involved have been brought to justice. Thaksin’s tough line towards southern Malay insurgents during his premiership from 2001 to 2006 was accompanied by a serious deterioration in the security situation. Relations with Malaysia were also strained after Thaksin accused Kuala Lumpur of providing shelter to Muslim terrorists.
Yet another problem is the reluctance of the BRN-C to reveal the identities of its leaders.
With Bangkok appointing an unpopular negotiator, and the insurgent leadership unwilling to surface, meaningful negotiations seem very unlikely.
Potential mediators, such as the 56-member Organization of Islamic Conference, could play a useful role. But successive Bangkok governments have avoided this option for fear that the issue would become internationalized.
Further complicating the picture is the army’s opposition to any attempt to give the southern provinces any real autonomy. Fearing yet another military coup, the Yingluck government has gone out of its way to avoid challenging the army’s high command. Just how the prime minister intends to implement political devolution in the south without alienating the military is far from clear.
Even so, the status quo cannot continue for long. The almost daily attacks are increasing in both frequency and scale. On March 31, four bombs exploded in Yala shopping districts and the parking lot of a hotel in Hat Yai. Sixteen people were killed and more than 300 were injured. Numerous shootings have taken place since.
Presumably the army will soon be demanding yet another bloody crackdown along the lines of that last seen during Thaksin’s administration. Sadly, the failure of current peace efforts will likely provide the perfect excuse.
By Bruce Gale
Bruce Gale is a senior writer at the Straits Times in Singapore. ― Ed.
(The Straits Times/ Asia News Network)
