The first half year of Xi Jinping’s tenure as China’s president has been marked by tighter control over the ideological sector. In less than six months, he has launched two salvos against liberals who asked for political reform.

Two months after assuming the presidency in mid-March, Xi issued Document No. 9. This banned discussions on constitutionalism, universal values, civil society, the independence of the judiciary, press freedom, crony capitalism and the past mistakes of the Chinese Communist Party.

The official press followed up by launching a fierce propaganda campaign against constitutionalism and universal values. The latter phrase is a generic expression that includes concepts like freedom, democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights.

The press argued that these were meant to undermine the CCP’s rule.

Then, on Aug. 19, Xi called a National Conference on Propaganda to wage a full-fledged war against his ideological foes.

At the conference, he gave a long speech explaining why it was necessary to do so. In his words: “The collapse of a regime usually starts with the ideological sector.

Once the ideological front is breached, other lines of defence can hardly hold their ground. Thus, political turmoil and regime change could take place overnight.”

Clearly, he was drawing lessons from the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the East European bloc.

“We must strike hard at a handful of reactionary intellectuals making use of the Internet to spread rumours, attack and slander the CCP’s rule, the socialist system and the national regime,” he said, according to an unpublished version of his speech made available to dissident writer Gao Yu.

The official media immediately echoed the call. In a series of articles, the People’s Daily said that it was time to “show the sword” to critics. The Global Times, Red Flag, Qiushi and the Beijing Daily all chorused the same theme of “showing the sword” to liberal intellectuals.

Advocates of universal values, they claimed, were the “most dangerous enemies of the Chinese people,” and cyberspace had become the most important battle ground between the CCP and its ideological foes.

The chilling effect of Xi’s Aug. 19 speech was felt immediately. The Global Times admitted that following the speech, several hundred microbloggers across the country were “administratively detained” for “spreading rumors” in cyberspace.

The ferocity with which Xi launched his ideological struggle surprised many.

First, it suggested a possible return to the days of CCP founder Mao Zedong. Mao placed overwhelming weight on ideological struggles, stressing that “class struggle should be the center of everything.” Mao insisted on making a sharp distinction between capitalism and socialism. The result was chaos.

To correct Mao’s mistakes, his successor Deng Xiaoping ordered an end to the ideological debate with a famous saying: “A cat is good as long as it catches mice, regardless of whether it is black or white.” He said that his “greatest invention” was “not to debate” ideological issues.

Deng’s successor Jiang Zemin followed suit. He wanted the Chinese to “make big money while keeping the mouth shut”. Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang, tried to shy away from ideological disputes altogether.

In his Aug. 19 speech, however, Xi put ideological work side by side with economic development, declaring it “an extremely important task” of the CCP.

In doing so, Xi has become China’s first leader since Mao to stress the importance of ideology. Understandably, this has raised popular concern that Maoism may be revived.

Bao Tong, political secretary of former CCP chief Zhao Ziyang who was disgraced after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, said that a new axe was falling on the liberals. He was referring to the clean-up campaign in cyberspace following Xi’s speech.

Some are more optimistic. Wu Jiaxiang, a scholar who helped Zhao draft the country’s first political reform program in 1987, believes Xi’s leftward moves are “an act.”

He told Asiaweek that they are meant to shore up Xi’s legitimacy by showing himself as a loyal Mao follower. Every newly installed leader must do the same, said Wu.

Wu stressed that Xi had a strong propensity to reform because his father Xi Zhongxun was strongly reform-minded. Xi, he believed, would not deviate too much from his father.

Wu suggested that Xi might have had to make this leftward shift to balance his purge of Bo Xilai. After all, the downfall of the former Chongqing party boss was a severe blow to Maoists.

“He had taken too many drastic actions since he took over the helm, and he needed to have some balancing,” said Wu.

Some also claimed that Xi wanted to seize the ideological banner from Bo and thus prove his own “redness.” Significantly, even after Bo was arrested and tried, his popularity remained undiminished.

The official Qiushi magazine, for example, carried an article on its website on Sept. 15 calling Bo a national hero without actually mentioning his name. It was soon taken down. The incident has led some to think that Xi has been trying to co-opt Bo’s followers. What Xi is really up to, however, is anybody’s guess.

By Ching Cheong

Ching Cheong is a senior journalist with The Straits Times. ― Ed.

(The Straits Times)

(Asia News Network)