This is the first installment in a special New Year’s series of interviews with preeminent scholars on international politics and security. ― Ed.


Lessons from history can help us tackle today’s challenges and prepare for an uncertain future, but when the memories of the past take on political overtones, they can fuel unnecessary nationalism and hamper collective efforts to move forward.

According to professor Peter Katzenstein of Cornell University, “memory politics” has contributed to Northeast Asia’s paradoxical situation in which cooperation in the sensitive areas of security and politics is lackluster despite deepening socioeconomic interdependence.

“Memory politics is about defending or gaining power. And political entrepreneurs in all countries use memory politics to consolidate or advance their positions,” the German-born scholar told The Korea Herald. “This is regrettable, but a fact of life.”

He noted the need for a different stance toward the past and memory to address the “Asia Paradox,” a term that South Korean President Park Geun-hye has used to refer to the region’s historical animosity and political distrust.

On the issue of the long-running historical antagonism between South Korea and Japan, Katzenstein indicated that the two neighbors would be able to find a way to mend fences should they explore the lessons from the Franco-German reconciliation process in the early 1960s.

Asked what South Korea can learn from German reunification, he said that rebuilding North Korea, should reunification occur, would be a costly, time-consuming process, but could lead to the economic bonanza that Park has mentioned.

The following is the interview with professor Katzenstein:

The Korea Herald: Cold War-like tensions still live on in Northeast Asia. What are the origins of the tensions and how can they be eased?

Peter Katzenstein: It is true that Cold War tensions linger because issues of national unification have been left unresolved not only for Korea but also for China and to a lesser degree also for Japan. And as long as these issues remain unsettled, so will the region. But the current dynamic in the region is shaped by new nationalist tensions as well, stoked by both China and Japan. The rise of China and the maritime aspirations it is now articulating in the South China Sea are perceived as a threatening move by Japan, several of China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and the United States. Nationalist forces in all countries, and not only in China, have something to do with this. And so does the unsettled legal situation of the disputed islands. The old Cold War and the new Cold Peace are thus interacting in ways that keep East Asia on edge.

KH: Regional cooperation in East Asia on the economy, tourism and culture is very active, but much less so in security and politics. How do you think we can address the “Asia Paradox”?

Katzenstein: The “Asia Paradox” is indicative of the human predicament of dealing with the past. Painful events of the past ― and there have been many in Asia, created by forces that acted from without and within the region ― have helped create that paradox. Besides past events it is today’s memory politics that contribute to these troubles. Memory politics is about defending or gaining power. And political entrepreneurs in all countries use memory politics to consolidate or advance their positions. This is regrettable, but a fact of life. To create the predictable expectation of peaceful change requires a different stance toward the past and memory. In this respect Western Europe offers some important lessons for East Asia. Addressing the horrors of one’s own past, honestly and squarely, horrors suffered and atrocities committed, is the first and most important step to escape this trap. Looking for one’s own faults is hard; but it points to a way forward. Pointing fingers at the fault of others is easy; but it makes finding that way much more difficult.

KH: South Korea’s efforts to deter North Korean aggression have focused mostly on improving the military. Do you have any constructivist solutions ― other than a realist balance-of-power approach ― to promote peace and cooperation on the peninsula?

Katzenstein: My understanding is that over the last few decades South Korea has tried various policies, ranging from balancing to engagement, to deal with North Korean policies. The choice of policy has varied depending on the behavior of North Korea, relations with the U.S., the political alignments in East Asia, and South Korea’s domestic politics. Peace and cooperation is therefore (elusive) not only due to the erratic behavior and often threatening posture of North Korea. Instead many other political forces are at play.

KH: North Korea’s development of nuclear arms has been one of the biggest security challenges to South Korea, the U.S. and world peace. The international community has tried various options to persuade Pyongyang to renounce nuclear weapons, including the six-party denuclearization talks. Why do you think the North has stuck to nuclear development and do you think there is a way to persuade the North to abandon it?

Katzenstein: I agree that North Korean nuclear weapons are the biggest security threat for South Korea and also for East Asia more generally. But they are perhaps not quite as central for the U.S. and world peace. North Korea is not willing to relinquish its nuclear arsenal for perfectly understandable reasons. Branded as part of the “axis of evil” by President Bush, a nuclear deterrent is, from the perspective of N. Korea, the most important guarantor of the security of the regime and the state. Libya decided to scrap its weapons of mass destruction, including its rudimentary nuclear program, in 2003 ― with disastrous consequences for both the regime and the state.

KH: South Korea has been studying the German unification process for lessons that could apply to Korean reunification. President Park Geun-hye has paid much attention to reunification, which she said would create an “economic bonanza” for the entire region. What do you think South Korea can learn from Germany’s case and do you have any suggestions to help bring about Korean unification?

Katzenstein: Over the past two decades I have given several lectures in South Korea on this subject. The German situation is very different in many respects, of course, but in one essential one it is identical. Should the occasion for a unification process arise, South Korean politicians, like their West German colleagues, will be surprised, will be forced to act in haste, and will not be able to say no to the request of the North Koreans for unification. The pull of nationalism will be too strong. And it will be expensive ― judging by the German experience the price tag will run in the hundreds of billions of dollars, for South Korea to rebuild North Korea, a process which will take decades. The very high costs may of course yield eventually the economic bonanza that President Park is speaking of.

KH: The relationship between South Korea and Japan has been worsening. In particular, Tokyo’s lack of atonement for its wartime atrocities has exacerbated anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea, which is hampering bilateral cooperation. South Koreans still have bitter memories of Japanese colonization. Is it possible to fundamentally improve the relationship?

Katzenstein: The answer is a simple yes. France and Germany were locked for five centuries in an enduring enmity, with three disastrous wars between 1870 and 1945. That history was ended by the farsighted political leadership provided by President Charles de Gaulle and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and an important Franco-German friendship treaty signed in 1962. That treaty generated a political commitment to civil society politics, transnational relations, youth exchanges, and most importantly the teaching of an agreed-upon history, reflected in shared textbooks and history curricula. Within a generation this shift in policy had profound effects. There were promising starts in Japan in the 1990s to apply this lesson but unfortunately domestic politics interfered, and Japan has now turned in a more nationalist direction. Still South Korea should try to focus attention on the teaching of joint history and many peace groups in both South Korea and Japan are doing this important work. I hope that the two governments will eventually follow.

KH: One major security concern is the rise of China. Do you think China can be led to rise “peacefully,” and if so, under what conditions?

Katzenstein: I think nobody will lead China’s rise other than the Chinese people and leadership. The country is experiencing an exciting period in its history and it is facing daunting challenges. If there is a war party in China, of the type that existed in Germany before 1914 and 1939 and in Japan in the 1930s, I have not seen or heard of it. China’s economic rise in Asia and in the world is inexorable. What China will make of this politically remains to be seen. Too much assertiveness will yield an almost instantaneous reaction as it has since 2011. I am sure that the Chinese government is smart enough to recognize this.

KH: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a good example of Asian integration. Do you think ASEAN integration could cause the rest of Asia to seek integration? Do you think Asia can achieve regional integration as Europe has done? What would the challenges to such integration efforts be?

Katzenstein: These are very big questions requiring very long answers. I have written a book and many articles on this subject. I think ASEAN may have some lessons for East Asia, but I doubt that the ASEAN Way can become Asia’s Way. The structural differences between Northeast and Southeast Asia are too great, and so is their weight in world politics. What is undeniably occurring in both parts of Asia is market integration. Political integration in its many different forms is another matter. I see little chance for political integration that enjoys popular support as long as memory politics uses the past for short term political gain.

KH: As a constructivist theorist, you have touched on the role of culture, civilization, social context and interaction in promoting security. Some may say that the constructivist approach would take too much time, and may be somewhat unrealistic. What do you think about this?

Katzenstein: Actually I am not a “constructivist” but an “eclecticist.” I take my explanations from wherever, depending on the question that interests me. To paraphrase Chairman Deng (Xiaoping of China), whether the cat is black or white does not matter, as long as it catches the mouse. Furthermore, constructivism, like rational choice, is not a theory but a language devoid of any analytical content. We live in an impatient age. If you cannot fix things by tomorrow it is not worth fixing. France and Germany fixed five centuries of war in a generation ― an amazingly short time and a vast historical achievement.

KH: There have been concerns over the intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China for regional dominance, as South Korea wants to continue its security relationship with the U.S. and its economic partnership with China. What is the smart way forward for Korea?

Katzenstein: I agree that South Korea has to maneuver smartly but I also know that South Korea has a very long history of dealing with two large and overbearing neighbors. It will surely manage the complicated relationship between China and the U.S. by doing what small states do in such situations: leaning outside of the canoe one way or the other when one or the other great power appears to become too powerful. Adroit balancing and bandwagoning is the hallmark of small power diplomacy. History tells us that Korea and South Korea have been quite good at it.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)


Peter J. Katzenstein

● Katzenstein, the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. professor of International Studies at Cornell University, studies the politics of civilizations, public diplomacy, regionalism in world politics, law, religion and popular culture.

● He has written and edited about 40 books, and more than 100 articles or book chapters. His recent books include “Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities beyond West and East” and “Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes beyond East and West.”

● He was president of the American Political Science Association from 2008-09. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Science in 1987 and the American Philosophical Society in 2009.

● He received the APSA’s 1974 Helen Dwight Reid Award for the best dissertation in international relations, and its 1986 Woodrow Wilson prize for the best U.S. book on international affairs.

● Since 1982, he has edited the Cornell University Press’ political economy series, which includes more than 100 titles.

● He earned a bachelors’ degree in politics, economics and literature from Swarthmore College in 1967, and a master’s from the London School of Economics in 1968. Six years later he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University.