Fifteen years ago on June 15, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il issued a joint declaration after their historic summit in Pyongyang.

The June 15 South-North Joint Declaration was highlighted by the two leaders’ agreement to pursue “independent” reunification, reunions of separated families, expansion of social and cultural exchanges and government-level talks.

The agreement brought an instant thaw in the two Koreas’ relations, which led to numerous programs: there were talks between high-ranking government officials, including the defense ministers; Red Cross officials arranged reunions of families separated in the two Koreas; and the South provided various forms of humanitarian assistance to the impoverished North.

Most noteworthy was the start of South Koreans’ touring of the Mount Geumgangsan resort in the North and the Gaeseong Industrial Park, where South Korean firms run factories manned by North Korean workers.

Many thought that, as Kim Dae-jung had believed, the South Korean leader’s “sunshine policy” of engaging the North would help the isolationist, belligerent regime take off its winter cloak and embrace the South and the international community.

Fifteen years later, however, few on either side of the border and outside the peninsula think that the two Koreas are closer to each other than they were after the 2000 summit in Pyongyang.

Perhaps there have been more serious cases of conflicts and tension than memorable moments of reconciliation. A good case in point is the North’s nuclear weapons development program.

The North’s first major provocation came less than two years after the Pyongyang summit ― a naval gun battle in the West Sea at the height of the 2002 football World Cup finals, which South Korea cohosted with Japan.

Then came the second nuclear crisis later in the year, this time involving the North’s uranium enrichment program. Defying warnings from the international community, the Kim Jong-il regime continued with its nuclear ambitions.

In 2005, Pyongyang declared it was armed with a nuclear arsenal and conducted its first nuclear test one year later. This prodded Roh Moo-hyun to go to Pyongyang in 2007 for the second inter-Korean summit.

The effects of the Roh-Kim summit were short-lived, too, and the long chill started as a conservative government led by Lee Myung-bak took office in the South.

Their cold war-like confrontation peaked when the North conducted a second nuclear test in 2009 and torpedoed the Cheonan corvette and shelled Yeonpyeongdo Island in 2010.

The attack on the Cheonan, in which 46 South Korean sailors perished, especially remains a thorn in the side of inter-Korean relations, as the Seoul government imposed the so-called May 24 sanctions that banned most exchange programs and assistance to the North.

Undoubtedly unhappy with the inauguration of another conservative government in the South, the North detonated its third nuclear bomb shortly before Park Geun-hye moved into the Blue House in early 2013.

But Park has since prioritized improvement of relations with the North, putting forward things like the “trust-building process,” the Dresden Declaration and the now-famous “unification as a bonanza” approach. Most recently, her government allowed a South Korean civilian group to ship fertilizer aid to the North in April, the first such case since the Cheonan sinking.

But the northern side does not seem ready to return to the negotiation table. One thing illustrating the state of inter-Korean relations is that the two sides failed to organize a joint celebration of the 15th anniversary of the June 15 summit. Under these circumstances, prospects are also low for a joint commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in August.

This all tells us that it indeed is difficult to achieve a fundamental, structural shift in the decades-long confrontation between the two Koreas. But this should not allow both sides to neglect endeavors to find common ground and improve bilateral relations.

It would be better for the South to make fresh initiatives, since the North, which regards its pride as important, would not easily come with hat in hand. Exchanges of envoys or closed-door contacts could prove effective under the current situation.