Lee Jae-myung’s plan to dismantle powerful agencies may serve politics more than policy
In democratic societies, elections are meant to usher in renewal. In South Korea, they often bring a different kind of transformation, too — the wholesale reconfiguration of government itself.
With the June 3 early presidential election fast approaching, Lee Jae-myung of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea stands as the clear front-runner. He is also poised to pursue an ambitious overhaul of the government’s structure. His party’s proposed revisions to the Government Organization Act would split existing ministries, create new ones and shift key powers across bureaucratic lines. These moves, dressed in the language of efficiency, raise deeper concerns about governance, institutional stability and the political motivations driving change.
At the heart of the proposal is a plan to dismantle the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Under the new framework, budgeting responsibilities would be handed to a new Planning and Budget Office under either the prime minister or the presidential office, while a separate Ministry of Finance and Economy would oversee fiscal policy. Additional restructuring would follow: The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy would be divided into separate departments to handle climate policy, energy, trade and industrial development.
Proponents argue these shifts will make the government more specialized and responsive to policy challenges. But history offers a sobering counterpoint. Similar restructurings in the past — including a previous attempt to separate the budgeting function — yielded more disruption than progress. The eventual reintegration of those roles was not an admission of failure, but a recognition that coherence and continuity matter as much as, if not more than, compartmentalized specialization.
The cost of such reorganizations is not merely financial, though the burden of establishing new agencies — with their ministers, deputies, secretariats and administrative personnel — is hardly trivial. More troubling is the erosion of institutional memory and the inconsistency that often accompanies sweeping changes. Bureaucracies depend on continuity to function effectively. Constant rebranding and reshuffling, however well-intentioned, tend to generate friction, not fluency. The result is often a government that is less coordinated, less agile and less able to respond in times of national need.
Then there's the politics. Lee has repeatedly cast the Ministry of Economy and Finance as an overreaching “king” among ministries, suggesting its influence must be curbed. His adversarial stance raises a difficult question: Are these reforms about improving governance, or about consolidating political control? Transferring budgetary authority to the presidential office risks politicizing fiscal decisions and weakening the checks and balances safeguarding public spending from partisan or short-term priorities.
Fragmenting existing ministries into narrower entities may also hinder, rather than help, coordination. Interagency overlap is already a challenge in policy execution and crisis response. Further segmentation could exacerbate confusion, duplicate responsibilities and blur lines of accountability. It is no small irony that a reform billed as an efficiency measure could lead to more bureaucracy, slower responses and diminished state capacity.
Complicating matters is the compressed transition timeline. The next administration will assume office immediately after the election, without the usual support of a formal transition committee. It will inherit urgent challenges: preparing a national budget, addressing a sluggish economy and managing high-stakes trade talks with the Trump administration. In such a critical moment, diverting political capital and administrative energy to dismantling and rebuilding ministries is not reform — it is a distraction.
Lee’s electoral strength gives his promises weight. But bold leadership also requires restraint. South Korea needs institutional stability, not symbolic reinvention. The public cares less about what a ministry is called and more about whether it delivers competent, accountable governance.
Real reform lies in improving what exists, not reinventing it for the sake of appearances.