Published : Jan. 19, 2016 - 17:19
Since North Korea announced its “hydrogen bomb” test on Jan. 6, mass media and numerous experts have been expressing their views on North Korea’s true intentions and South Korea’s policy options. In general, they demand more aggressive and proactive policies toward the communist nation.
They recommend stronger military preparedness and response; stronger and comprehensive military sanctions unilaterally or in cooperation with the U.S. and Japan; stronger pressure on China to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear program; and stronger UNSC sanctions on North Korea.
Would these measures be able to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions? Are there other options? It is time to review Seoul’s entire North Korea policy and adopt a new approach to Pyongyang’s nuclear programs.
We have to know why North Korea tries to develop and maintain its nuclear program. It decided to develop nuclear weapons immediately after its attempt to unify Korea by force failed in 1953. However, until China succeeded in its nuclear weapons test in 1964, the North was unable to begin nuclear weapons development mainly because the Soviet Union and China refused to provide it technical know-how.
North Korea had mainly resorted to subversion and infiltration for reunification since the end of the Korea war. As South Korea’s economic development and military strength surpassed the North’s in the early 1970s and China’s defense commitment to North Korea weakened after its rapprochement with the U.S. in1972, North Korea began to accelerate its nuclear weapons program to compensate for its relative military weakness and blackmail South Korea and the U.S. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North has desperately sought nuclear arms.
This shows that since the Cold War ended, North Korea has become defensive and more dependent on the WMDs. Because of this, Pyongyang will not abandon its nuclear weapons unless and until its political system’s security is completely guaranteed by the South and the four powers, particularly the U.S. This is the reason why North Korea has demanded arms reduction between the two Koreas, the end of the extended deterrence by the U.S. or denuclearization of Korea, withdrawal of the U.S. forces from South Korea, a peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea or the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance, and the guarantee of North Korea’s security by the four powers as conditions for its abandonment of the WMDs. Thus, North Korea puts top priority on national security rather than economic development.
Therefore, economic cooperation between South and North Korea is secondary. It considers South Korea’s trust-building approach as a disguised form of undermining its political system. Under the circumstances, South Korea and the U.S. should proactively pursue ways to relieve the North Korean leadership of a seize mentality.
First, the Six-Party Talks can deal with the denuclearization of North Korea and the Northeast Asian security community simultaneously. The previous conference decided that the former is to be realized first. The six parties can establish the Northeast security community before the denuclearization of North Korea is completed, or execute both plans simultaneously.
The Northeast Asian security community should take the form of a concert of powers so that the four great powers can guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula. If it is established, a peace treaty between the two Koreas or between North Korea and the U.S. will not be needed.
Second, if the six parties cannot reach an agreement on the concert of powers, North Korea and the U.S. can conclude a peace treaty, in which they recognize each other and pledge mutual nonaggression. But the U.S.-South Korea mutual defense pact should remain in effect because the right to conclude mutual defense pacts is an inalienable right of all states and the U.S.-South Korea treaty is aimed at any states that attack either of the parties to the treaty.
The U.S. ground troops can be moved to the most southern part of the peninsula or ultimately withdrawn. The U.S. can also pledge no-first use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. During the negotiations, the U.N. Security Council sanctions as well as the individual countries’ sanctions should remain in effect, while North Korea should suspend the development of the WMDs. In order to induce North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. should withdraw its demand for North Korea’s prior commitment to the abandonment of its nuclear program. But the negotiations can be called off if North Korea evades its commitment.
Third, if North Korea refuses to accept the second package of proposals, South Korea, U.S. and Japan propose to the UNSC for the adoption of comprehensive economic and military sanctions against North Korea, while the five other parties collectively or South Korea, the U.S. and Japan individually impose their own comprehensive sanctions. China’s participation in this package of sanctions is crucial.
Finally, if the above proposals fail, the U.S. and South Korea should pursue the strongest deterrence strategy.
The above package of proposals can be made sequentially or simultaneously. The negotiating parties should know that international negotiations can hardly succeed without give-and-take. It is essential that South Korea should switch its trust-building approach to the nuclear disarmament-first approach.
By Park Sang-seek
Park Sang-seek is a former rector of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies and the author of “Globalized Korea and Localized Globe.” — Ed.