Published : Oct. 17, 2012 - 19:51
The line runs westward from the Han River estuary immediately above Ganghwa Island, goes a little down to the south and then creeps to the west to the tip of Yeonpyeong Island. From there the line moves northwest all the way to the cluster of three islands, Socheong, Daecheong and Baengnyeong. Between Yeonpyeong and Socheong, the line precariously runs close to the North Korean coast, leaving only a few kilometers (miles) of space to the land. This is the Northern Limit Line or NLL for short.
People who take a close look at the NLL have complex feelings. North Korea suffers great inconvenience because of the virtual blockade of a sizeable portion of its western coast. But many think that it is the price North Korea has to pay for the land it grabbed as a result of the Korean War that it started. There can be no concession whatsoever to concede any part of the line stretching some 200 kilometers to ease the North’s difficulties.
Yet there may be some who might believe that time has come, after six decades of imposing the “unilaterally drawn” NLL on the North, to apply a little flexibility on the maritime demarcation line and allow the passage of North Korean vessels through the line, especially the 100-kilometer portion between Yeonpyeong and Socheong Islands. The late president Roh Moo-hyun and some of his advisers might have belonged to this group. They could argue that this is necessary to reduce tension in the West Sea.
A big controversy has flared up in the arena of presidential campaign as a first-term National Assemblyman of the majority Saenuri Party claimed that he has evidence that former president Roh told then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il of his willingness to abandon the NLL during their summit in Pyongyang in 2007.
The Saenuri Party is pressing the opposition Democratic United Party to accept its request for a National Assembly investigation into the former president’s “dangerous” statement on the NLL. If Roh Moo-hyun was ready to give up the NLL, his political heir Moon Jae-in should not have a much different idea. Moon, the DUP’s presidential candidate who was Roh’s chief of staff at the time of the summit, denied the whole allegation.
To settle the dispute, we may have to ask the two dead leaders of the South and North. Roh’s party, since its defeat in the 2008 election, underwent regroupings and changes of names and platforms to put up the new signboard of the Democratic United Party shortly before the parliamentary elections last April. Saenuri’s attempt to accuse the present main opposition party of a sellout of territory does not seem quite persuasive.
We need a little study on the demarcation line enforced in the West Sea since 1953. During the three-year Korean War, the U.N. forces maintained complete air and naval supremacy over and around the peninsula and occupied almost all offshore islands. Upon the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the U.N. and South Korean forces withdrew from the islands north of the 38th parallel but retained Baengnyeong, Daecheong, Socheong, Yeonpyeong and Udo islands, which were South Korean territories before the war.
The coastal areas opposite these five West Sea islands were now DPRK territory as the North Korean/Chinese forces had advanced to the Han River estuary on the western front while the U.N./South Korean forces had grabbed the hilly northern region on the eastern front. To protect the five islands, and actually to keep South Korean forces from going northward (President Syngman Rhee opposed ending the war without unification), the U.N. Command drew the “Northern Limit Line.”
Pyongyang continuously demanded the lifting of the unilaterally designated demarcation line, which represented a great humiliation for the Northern regime, but it showed no attempt of forcefully abrogating it ― until the naval clash in 1998. It is ironic that the first sea battles which left fatalities on both sides took place during the Kim Dae-jung administration with a soft approach to the North.
The 1992 Basic Agreement confirmed the NLL as the maritime demarcation line between the two Koreas. The 2000 and 2007 inter-Korean summits discussed how to ease tension in the West Sea and exploit the sea for peaceful pursuits such as establishing a “West Sea Special Peace Zone.” Yet, whatever former President Roh Moo-hyun might have thought and told the Northerners privately or publicly, his administration did not do anything to change the status quo.
The sinking of the Cheonan, attributed to a torpedo attack, and the unprecedented artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island occurred during the current Lee Myung-bak administration while inter-Korean relations remained frozen. These attacks testified that the North Korean military’s patience with the NLL had reached its limit.
Looking at the map, we find the distance between Baengnyeong-Daecheong-Socheong islands to the north and Yeonpyeong Island to the southeast is quite substantial. North Korea wants to have free passage through this wide gap and engage in fishing in the general area. They once declared an exclusive sea lane through this opening but it was completely ignored by Seoul. Moon Jae-in now proposes creating joint fishing areas across the NLL.
Negotiation for any peaceful project along the NLL requires a precondition or proper order of events. The two Koreas should take mutual steps to ease military tension in the West Sea with some kind of pact first, removing coastal batteries in the North to be reciprocated by the South with the reduction of its naval elements around the five islands, for example. Opening the NLL for joint fishing or the passage of North Korean vessels without effective tension-reduction measures will only result in the isolation of our territories Baengnyeong, Daecheong and Socheong islands.
The NLL poses a great problem for inter-Korean relations, but this constant flash point could also offer an opportunity to enter constructive negotiations for whatever steps necessary if the two sides genuinely seek peace. The 10-month rule of Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang has yet to show any sign of possible thaw, and they must perhaps be awaiting the result of the election here in December.
In the meantime, politicians in the South definitely need to avoid picking up quarrels over alleged remarks of a dead president. After all, general voters are not too concerned as they are aware that policy continuity is often forgotten in our political community. As late as in the last parliamentary elections, the DUP leaders repudiated the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the naval base project on Jeju Island which both were initiated by the Roh Moo-hyun administration.
By Kim Myong-sik
Kim Myong-sik is a former editorial writer for The Korea Herald. ― Ed.